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bACkground
This report is a contribution to an assessment of the current status of agriculture in Cambodia, 
focusing on the linkages between agriculture and water, mainly in the form of irrigation. It seeks to 
view current government policies on agriculture and irrigation in the context of experiences on the 
ground, as communicated through the many field studies that cover varied aspects of performance 
in the agriculture sector and irrigation schemes. In an effort to identify future research areas, this 
review examines the status quo, and connects or disconnects with stated policy through a broad 
lens to capture strengths and challenges across crop production, irrigation management and 
post-harvest contexts. It places irrigation under scrutiny in terms of its value as a major area of 
government expenditure in recent years, and asks whether it presents the best potential for future 
gains in productivity, when compared with the prospects offered by investments in other aspects 
of agriculture.
The fieldwork and review of current literature that form the basis of this report were undertaken at 
the request of, and partly funded by, the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research 
(ACIAR). It is also intended to contribute knowledge to the CGIAR Research Program on Aquatic 
Agricultural Systems (AAS) led by WorldFish, who co-funded the activities. 
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The contents of this report are drawn mainly from the literature sourced through inter-library 
searches, the use of Google Scholar and Google web-based search engines. Information presented 
in the literature has been combined with first-hand data collected by the authors through a 
mixture of key informant interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) in the Kamping Pouy and 
Boeng Sne irrigation schemes in Battambang and Prey Veng Provinces, respectively, in September 
2012. These discussions were held with a range of stakeholders linked to the irrigation schemes 
and to local development at village, commune and provincial levels (Table 1). Efforts were made to 
ensure there was representation from villages situated at different points in the irrigation schemes, 
and from both men and women.
An attempt has been made to provide an up-to-date representation of the literature reviewed, with 
an emphasis on the more recent findings. Differences in results and opinion have been highlighted 
where they arise, to reflect the heterogeneity of the biophysical, geographical and socio-cultural 
contexts involved.
The first section deals with the main policy narratives, in terms of overall development directions and the 
positioning of agriculture and irrigation within the national development policy framework. Key policy 
objectives and their rationale are explained, along with some detail on strategic actions identified to reach 
these policy goals. An overview of performance of the agriculture sector, focussing on rice production, 
and the irrigation schemes is presented in the next section, followed by an unpacking of factors that 
explain the present status quo in the next section. In so doing, an attempt has been made to construct 
a holistic, multidisciplinary picture of the multiple drivers distributed across a range of sectoral spaces. 
This is to avoid simplifying the complexity of an issue, and to illustrate the need for intersectoral (or at 
least interdisciplinary) tools to address them. The following section discusses stated policy in light of 
the messages from the field coming through the existing literature and IWMI’s fieldwork, and identifies 
implications of the current policy, especially for smallholder farmers. The conclusions in the last section 
seek to convert the analysis in the preceding sections into workable recommendations.
Kamping Pouy Boeng Sne
Focus group discussions
Kamping Pouy farmer water-user community 
(FWUC) members 
Farmer water-user community, Teae Commune
Ta Ngen fisheries community members Fisheries community members, Theae Commune
Takrin Commune Council (CC) Chief, other CC 
members and heads of two villages in Takrin 
Commune 
Theay Commune Council Chief and heads of six 
villages in Theay Commune
Pnomsampau Commune agriculture 
cooperative (three villages inside the scheme)
Key informant interviews
Deputy Director, Provincial Department of Water Officer-in-charge of main sluice gate and canal, 
Resources Meteorology (PDoWRAM) PDoWRAM, Ba Phnom (BP) District
Chief, Agriculture Extension Office, Battambang 
Province
Chief, Office of Agriculture Extension (OAE)
Deputy Director, Provincial Department of 
Agriculture (PDA)
Chief of Agriculture District
Chief of Fisheries Division, Battambang Province Vice-Chief of Fishery Sector
Table 1: Stakeholder consultations in two case study sites
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The Cambodian Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set ambitious future development 
targets for the country, including eradication of extreme poverty and cutting in half the 
proportion of people who suffer from hunger by 2015. These are ambitious goals, given that 
Cambodia is among the poorest countries in the world, with 34% of its mainly rural population 
living on less than a dollar a day and 15-20% living in extreme poverty (RGC 2010a). Over 80% of 
Cambodia’s population (and more than 90% of its impoverished population) lives in rural areas. 
Thus, agriculture continues to be the mainstay of the economy, comprising 34% of the gross 
domestic product (GDP) and absorbing 60% of the total labor force (RGC 2010a). The Cambodian 
government positions agricultural and rural development as a priority issue in its efforts to achieve 
poverty reduction and economic growth. The country has relatively few economic resources 
except for its agriculture, fishery and forestry resources, few mineral resources (excluding recent 
indications of offshore reserves of oil and gas), limited hydropower potential and a small industrial 
base (ADB 2010). As rural agriculture is predominantly organized on the basis of smallholder farmer 
communities and families (Box 1), Cambodia’s agriculture and water sector policies will inevitably 
have a significant bearing on the well-being of the rural and poor population who represent the 
primary target of the government’s stated poverty reduction ambitions.
Central to these policy objectives is rice farming, which both dominates agricultural activities 
and production as well as rural livelihoods, lifestyles, values and customs. Since rice farming in 
Cambodia has traditionally been dependent on rainfall rather than irrigation, rainfall distribution 
determines the success and size of harvests (Wokker et al. 2011). Wet-season crops are grown 
in the rain-fed uplands, rain-fed lowlands and deepwater areas, and cover almost 2 million 
hectares (Mha) or nearly 90% of the rice-growing area in Cambodia (Rickman and Sinath 2004). 
Consequently, significant productivity gaps separate Cambodia into the productive southeastern 
Mekong floodplains and northwestern lowlands along the border to Thailand, and the less 
productive upland regions (Mund 2011). Due to a belief that this production scenario holds 
significant potential for yield gains through the provision of irrigation water, the government 
has been investing heavily in developing the country’s irrigation infrastructure over the past two 
decades. Statistics from MoWRAM indicate that by 2010, 1,120,246 ha (dry season: 347,058 ha; wet 
season: 773,188 ha) were irrigated, accounting for approximately 43% of the total cultivated land 
area (CDRI 2010). This has involved the rehabilitation of existing irrigation schemes, with financial 
support from external donors and aid agencies (Thuon et al. 2007).
introduCtion                                                                                  
Box 1. Classification of irrigation scales
Small-scale irrigation (service area < 200 ha): the system is managed by the District Office of 
Water Resources and Meteorology (WRAM) or by PDoWRAM, if it is in more than one district; it is 
operated and maintained by the beneficiaries under WRAM supervision.
Medium-scale irrigation (service area 200–5,000 ha): the system is managed by PDoWRAM or by 
the Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology (MoWRAM), if it is in more than one province. 
It is maintained by the PDoWRAM in cooperation with users and is repaired by MoWRAM.
Large-scale irrigation (> 5,000 ha): the system is managed and maintained by MoWRAM.
Source: CDRI 2008.
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However, agricultural growth has, on average, lagged behind the industry and services sectors 
since the mid-1990s, with large fluctuations and even occasional negative growth recorded in the 
early 2000s. A resurgence has been seen since 2005 when the agriculture sector’s performance 
has been consistently positive, with an increase in rice yields, from 1.8 tons (t)/ha in 1998 to 2.6 t/
ha in 2007 and a near doubling of rice production, from 3.5 million tons in 1998 to 6.7 million tons 
in 2007 (Kimsun et al. 2011). The increased production is attributed to a combination of increased 
yields and an expanded area under production. As a result, Cambodia is now self-sufficient in rice 
and produces 2 million tons of exportable surplus according to ADB (2010). Nevertheless, there is a 
felt need to reassess the future role of agriculture in Cambodia’s development in light of a growing 
number of studies that have sought to document the performance of many rehabilitated irrigation 
schemes, in terms of production and productivity, production and management efficiency, and 
the implications for smallholder farmers. Particular emphasis is placed on development policy 
which needs to balance the interests at the macro level with those of individuals, households and 
communities, and how present ground realities speak to current policy directions in the agriculture 
and irrigation sectors. This review, is intended to be a contribution to this discourse.
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Agriculture as the primary engine of 
economic growth and poverty reduction 
Given that 80% of Cambodians live in rural areas 
(CARD 2011), it is no surprise that agriculture 
sector development has, and continues to, 
occupy a central role in the country’s primary 
development policies and strategies. Its 
dominance of rural livelihoods and its low 
productivity are seen by the government as 
reasons to identify significant developmental 
potential, in terms of contributing to GDP 
growth and poverty reduction at household 
level. Therefore, the Royal Government of 
Cambodia’s (RGCs) Rectangular Strategy for 
Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency1 
(RS) sees agricultural development, and 
rehabilitation and construction of physical 
infrastructure, as central to alleviating poverty 
and enhancing economic growth. In fact, RGC 
aims to make agriculture a leading sector in 
the national economy and one that provides 
the foundation for sustainable economic 
growth (RGC 2010b). The National Strategic 
Development Plan (NSDP) (2006–2010) and 
its update covering the period 2009–2013, 
developed to operationalize the RS, emphasize 
investment in agriculture to overcome the 
core problems facing the sector: stagnant 
productivity, insufficient crop diversification, 
and underdeveloped and underperforming 
water resources. The updated NSDP recognizes 
that traditional engines of growth (tourism, 
garment exports and construction) must be 
complemented by more rural and broad-based 
sources (World Bank 2010). The government 
has prioritized the rice subsector, in particular, 
as the main sector for alleviating poverty, 
especially rural poverty. In 2010, the NSDP set 
a production target of 5.5 million tons for the 
rice sector, which was to be achieved through 
a yield increase from 2.0 t/ha in 2005 to 2.4 
t/ha in 2010. This called for an expansion in 
the proportion of irrigated land (including 
supplemental irrigation) from 20% to 25% 
during the same period, and the irrigated rice 
area to increase from 588,687 ha to 650,000 
ha. These targets were increased following the 
2008 Mid-Term Review of NSDP, where the rice 
production target was revised to 7.5 million 
tons, requiring the rice yield to increase to  
2.8 t/ha and the irrigated rice area to expand to 
867,000 ha (Yu and Diao 2010).
The Strategy for Agriculture and Water (SAW) 
(2010–2013), which operates within the NSDP 
framework, adopts a long-term development 
goal of sustainable and pro-poor management 
of water resources that envisages the integrated 
management of water and land resources in a 
river basin context. SAW also outlines several 
performance targets to be reached by the end 
of its term. 
•	 The	area	of	cropping	land	with	access	to	
irrigation services will be increased by 
100,000 ha. 
•	 The	incidence	of	drought-	or	flood-affected	
farmland will be reduced by 20%. 
•	 Agricultural	output	will	be	increased	by	20%.	
•	 Beneficiary	income	will	be	increased	by	20%.	
•	 Employment	in	the	agribusiness	and	 
agro-industrial sectors will be increased by 
20%. 
•	 Area	planted	with	cash	crops	will	be	
increased by 20%. 
•	 Value	of	agricultural	exports	will	be	
increased by 30%. 
In order to achieve these targets, SAW seeks 
to implement the following six programs (or 
‘pillars’):
A. Appropriate policy and legal frameworks in 
the agriculture and water sectors 
B. Institutional capacity building and 
human resource development for 
effective agricultural and water resources 
development and management 
C. Research and education to generate and use 
agricultural and water-related knowledge, 
information and technology transfer
D. Food security to ensure that resource-poor 
and food-insecure Cambodians have 
substantially improved physical and 
economic access to food that meet their 
dietary needs and food preferences
E. Integrated land and water resources 
management
F. Agricultural business and marketing 
that deliver real benefits to farmers, rural 
communities and other stakeholders
The policy landscape
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There are 24 components within these six 
pillars (detailed in Section 7 of SAW), which 
specify the objectives of each pillar. Pillar A 
focuses on developing and strengthening 
policy and regulatory frameworks, and 
their implementation in agricultural land 
management, marketing and the operation 
of farmer water-user communities (FWUCs). 
As Provincial Departments of Agriculture 
(PDAs) and Provincial Departments of Water 
Resources and Meteorology (PDoWRAMs) 
lack the capacity to deliver the technical 
services required under the law to provincial 
councils, SAW provides a budget and technical 
assistance to staff at PDAs and PDoWRAMs in 
three pilot provinces selected by the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) 
and the Ministry of Water Resources and 
Meteorology (MoWRAM). Constraints on the 
use and management of agricultural lands 
will be identified, and policies for governance 
of agricultural lands will be ratified. This will 
include the introduction of policy and legal 
frameworks rationalizing the conversion 
of forestland to agricultural uses in light of 
the mitigation measures needed to address 
climate change. It also recognizes that the 
establishment of FWUCs requires considerable 
attention and a long-term program. The 
components in Pillar A include the identification 
of policies for recommendation to the national 
assembly, which provide some protection to 
farmers against prevalent agricultural imports. 
Seen as a first legal step towards nurturing the 
agribusiness industry, these polices will need to 
be non-distortive and compatible with existing 
trade agreements. 
Pillar B seeks to introduce institutional 
mechanisms, mainly through financial and 
other incentives to staff, to improve service 
delivery of MAFF and MoWRAM. It also 
includes activities to improve and integrate 
their planning, budget and data and financial 
management systems. Improved dataset 
integration will facilitate planning of strategic 
interventions, monitoring and performance 
evaluation. 
The investments proposed in Pillar C 
recognize that agriculture and water resources 
management in Cambodia are severely 
constrained by a lack of appropriately qualified 
technical personnel at national and sub-
national levels. This component is designed 
to create a needs-based pool of trained 
people to meet the requirements of new and 
emerging technologies such as: biotechnology, 
hydraulics, conservation agriculture and market 
dynamics. This will provide a strong foundation 
of knowledge systems and human capital for 
delivering relevant, viable, farmer-centered 
and development-oriented services. This 
component seeks to build farmer capacities 
to overcome a range of environmental issues 
and production constraints (soil erosion and 
degradation; soil and water salinity; floods and 
drought; chemical pollution; river siltation; 
deforestation; loss of crop diversity and decline 
of fish stocks) by generating appropriate 
technologies and training resource-poor men 
and women farmers in prioritized technologies. 
Following training, farmers will be expected to 
participate in food processing, marketing and 
trading activities in support of their livelihoods, 
and will be more resilient to climate-induced 
uncertainties. It is estimated that in 2002, 
drought damaged more than 130,000 ha of rice, 
while floods damaged 40,000 ha, according to 
ADB (2012b). This approach is expected to ease 
post-harvest gaps that currently undermine the 
cost-effectiveness of production, processing 
and distribution as well as quality aspects that 
underpin market access and competitiveness. 
This will be facilitated by establishing a national 
food and agriculture processing technology 
center, staffed by trained and qualified 
researchers, to undertake research programs 
which generate value–added–market-oriented 
niche technologies that meet international 
standards.
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Pillar D aims to improve the food security of 
0.6 million individuals (approximately 120,000 
households) through training in low-input 
and improved technical packages for food 
production. These interventions aim to target 
on-farm and off-farm groups for income 
generation support through training and links 
to off-farm employment opportunities, or small-
scale agro-processing. This pillar also focuses 
on village-level institutional development 
and capacity building, and empowerment, 
through self-help groups including farmers’ 
groups and farmer cooperatives (FCs). They will 
receive technical and input support, including 
credits for: intensification and diversification of 
agriculture; land and soil management,  
post-harvest practices; processing and 
marketing. Support also includes largerscale 
village irrigation development and 
management, and other village infrastructure. 
This component assumes that registration in 
farmer organizations will be decentralized to 
the district level.
Pillar E emphasizes the need for more 
water data and integrated water resources 
management (IWRM), and the continued 
development of irrigation and water 
management infrastructure through a more 
participatory and integrated design process. 
The IWRM component focuses on delineating 
and classifying river basins, developing a water 
management framework plan for the Tonle Sap 
Basin, and creating multi-stakeholder water 
basin committees. Pillar E seeks to strengthen 
FWUCs to achieve their mandate and facilitate 
the government’s goal of rehabilitating or 
building 20,000 ha of wet season and 5,000 ha 
of dry season irrigation schemes per year, with 
direct participation from FWUCs.  Pillar E aims to 
improve the productivity of lowland and upland 
rice soils, strengthen smallholder land tenure 
security and productivity and the management 
of state land. To support this, the land resource 
inventory will be updated, generating 
crop zones and rice soil maps through soil 
surveys that identify soil-limiting factors for 
crop production. In view of increasing land-
use changes in the lowlands, sustainable 
techniques for soil fertility management and 
techniques for an integrated crop management 
(ICM) approach will be disseminated to farmers 
via the extension service. In the upland systems, 
where little is known about soils in the farming 
systems, extension workers will determine 
land suitability for field crops and train 
farmers in the use of sustainable soil fertility 
management techniques. Attention will be 
given to improving the management of social 
and economic land concessions (SLCs and ELCs) 
within a dual-track approach to land use and 
land tenure that uses a systematic land titling 
program for smallholder farmers (through 
SLCs2), while granting ELCs to private investors 
to support agribusiness development to 
generate rural off-farm employment and state 
revenue. SLCs for resource-poor smallholders 
focus on rice-growing areas in the Mekong and 
Tonle Sap river basins, and are seen as a way of 
enabling landless farmers to gain access to land 
for residential and subsistence farming—as 
temporary possession is not a route to legally 
acquiring land.3 ELCs will be granted in frontier 
and forested areas, which implies conversion 
of forestland. This will be preceded by a review 
of the ELCs to examine their contributions 
to job creation, government revenues and 
poverty reduction. This is expected to improve 
procedures for granting ELCs, including 
their transparency and participatory nature. 
Additionally, an action plan for mechanisms 
to resolve land disputes, which focuses on 
poor and vulnerable rural households, will be 
developed.
The priorities for Pillar F include improvement 
of: farm inputs and farm production, 
extension and outreach services and market 
infrastructure, and the development of markets. 
It is recognized that poor access to quality 
and efficient inputs is a major impediment to 
improving agricultural productivity. Fertilizers 
and agrochemicals are imported informally 
across the border from Thailand and Vietnam 
in small quantities. Sample testing has shown 
that fertilizers can be diluted by up to 48% and 
there are no Khmer instructions on the label 
for usage. Thus, MAFF plans to support private 
sector importers to provide bulk fertilizer and 
agrochemical imports from their countries of 
manufacture, improving quality and reducing 
unit costs. Merchants will also be licensed to 
help ensure that standards are maintained. 
Cambodian agriculture is not mechanized 
due to the small size of land holdings. Having 
access to the appropriate machinery for land 
preparation, harvesting or on-farm post-
harvest handling would allow expansion of 
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the area cultivated, which is currently limited 
by family labor. Pillar F aims to diversify 
agricultural production through extension 
and training, provided by the state and private 
sectors; to promote specific technologies and 
techniques; or address specific constraints 
such as diseases for specific crops. This will be 
supported by a study commissioned by MAFF, 
which will identify technologies for high-value 
crop production, including the use of tube 
wells and drip irrigation. Promotion of on-
farm post-harvest handling techniques (e.g. 
drying, cleaning, grading, storage, packaging 
and transport) for specific cash crops will 
provide higher incomes for farmers. Similarly, 
linking producers to markets by providing 
information on opportunities, developing 
marketing strategies to reach those markets, 
and providing access to associated services 
(such as business planning and financing) will 
help producers realize higher and more regular 
incomes.
An important recognition made in SAW about 
its pro-poor aspirations is that the Rectangular 
Strategy (RS) or other key strategic documents 
have never clearly identified the role of 
smallholder agriculture in achieving growth, 
including export production (RGC 2010a). Since 
over 70% of Cambodians (about 9.5 million) are 
engaged in agriculture and the vast majority 
of them are smallholder farmers4 (UNDP and 
Ministry of Environment 2011), ensuring that 
these farmers can significantly benefit from the 
many investments proposed in these policies 
will be central to the equitability of future 
agricultural development. 
SAW was followed by the Policy Paper on 
the Promotion of Paddy Production and 
Rice Export, which sets short-, medium- and 
long-term measures and related investment 
priorities to transform Cambodia into a key 
rice-exporting country (Box 2). It envisages 
the export of one million tons of milled rice 
by 2015, which would require an overall rice 
surplus of 4 million tons. The policy proposes 
that, with an estimated domestic consumption 
of approximately 3.14 million tons of paddy rice 
and provision for seeds and harvest loss, the 
statistics show a surplus of 3.32 million tons, 
which can be processed into milled rice for 
export. Yet, the official statistics for 2009 show 
that only 13,000 tons of milled rice or 20,000 
tons of paddy rice was exported, although 
Cambodia has actually exported much more 
milled rice. The gap between the supply surplus 
and official export figures reflects Cambodia’s 
potential to increase the official export of 
milled rice in place of the informal export of 
unprocessed paddy rice. In fact, according to 
SAW, the rice sector could become an important 
pillar to sustain Cambodia’s economic growth, 
while the garment sector is facing stiffer 
competition. If rice exports could reach 3 
million tons, the export value would be US$ 2.1 
billion (approximately 20% of GDP) or about 
US$ 600 million (approximately 5% of GDP) 
in value-added contribution to the national 
economy. The impacts on poverty is predicted 
to result from the employment of more than 
70% of rural people and income increases 
through a ready market for rice at better prices, 
and from other spin-off economic activities 
such as cooking oil production, aquaculture 
and animal husbandry using the broken rice, 
husk and brain produced during rice milling. 
Moreover, it assumes that such developments 
will translate into an equitable redistribution 
of economic gains. The promotion of milled 
rice export is also viewed as the first step in 
catalyzing the export of other agricultural 
products such as rubber and other crops.
12
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Box 2. The Policy Paper on the Promotion of Paddy Rice Production and Rice Export, 2010.
Measures for paddy rice production 
Quick-win measures 
•	 Increase	paddy	rice	productivity	by	using	high-yield	seed	varieties	and	modern	farming	
techniques. 
•	 Continue	to	expand	irrigation:	MoWRAM	to	improve	the	efficiency	of	water	management	on	
existing water resources.
•	 Continue	to	build	and	maintain	rural	roads.
•	 Promote	microcredit	for	agriculture.
Medium to longer term measures
•	 Improve	productivity	and	crop	intensification
o Enhance water management, which is key to crop productivity and intensification: 
MoWRAM and MAFF to develop a plan for Water Resources Management for the next 10-
20 years, with a focus on investment in irrigation systems and water management as top 
priorities.
o Increase investment to rehabilitate agricultural development stations.
o Expand agricultural extension services at commune level.
•	 Promote	implementation	of	the	National	Policy	on	Rural	Electrification.
•	 Promote	and	establish	farmer	organizations.
•	 Promote	and	encourage	the	implementation	of	policy	on	the	sustainable	use	of	agriculture	
land -
o The Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction (MLMUPC) must 
give priorities to delivering land titles in the potential rice production areas to ensure land 
tenure security, reduce disputes and encourage investment in land.
o MLMUPC must cooperate with MAFF and the agencies concerned to classify land-use 
zones.
Measures for paddy rice collection and processing 
Quick-win measures
•	 Encourage	participation	of	the	private	sector	in	paddy	rice	processing	and	milled	rice	export.
•	 Continue	financing	for	paddy	rice	collection	-	financial	mechanisms	to	make	it	easier	for	the	
communities, rice millers and exporters to access loans from sources such as commercial 
banks and credit facilities that are guaranteed by the government.
•	 Provide	support	and	strengthen	the	Rice	Millers	Association	(RMA)	-	the	RGC	will	provide	
special treatment to the RMA in the same way that it has supported the Garment 
Manufacturers Association in Cambodia (GMAC).
Medium to longer term measures
•	 Create	new	financial	instruments	and	leverage	mechanism	for	financing.
•	 Establish	and	strengthen	farmer	organizations	to	develop	the	open	paddy	market	through	
activities such as contract farming, weighing, drying and paddy-based collateralized loans for 
members, provision of high-quality seeds and fertilizers for market-driven rice production.
•	 Reduce	electricity	price	and	extend	coverage	areas.
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In the short-term, the policy paper recommends 
promoting paddy rice production to meet local 
market demand and formal exporting of milled 
rice (instead of informal export of paddy rice). 
In the medium to long term, the emphasis 
is on enhancing competitiveness in rice 
export through the promotion of production 
technology; management of soil fertility, water, 
seeds and fertilizers; organization of farmer 
associations; improvement of rice processing 
quality; expansion of physical infrastructure, 
including roads, railways, seaports and 
electrical energy; improvement of land use 
and management; and provision of short- and 
long-term credit as well as trade facilitation and 
exploring market opportunities (ADB 2012a). 
Similar to SAW, this will include establishing 
partial credit guarantee instruments to 
encourage commercial bank lending to the rice 
milling sector, and increase competitiveness 
of rice milling to reduce the dependence on 
informal cross-border exports to neighboring 
countries. Although the small- and medium 
-sized enterprise (SME) sector accounts for 
about 75% of all employment in Cambodia, 
and agribusinesses represent a significant 
component of SMEs, its contribution to GDP 
is marginal, due to the informal nature of a 
large number of enterprises whose output is 
not captured in national statistics (World Bank 
2010).
irrigation as a fundamental condition 
for agricultural intensification and 
building resilience to climate change
The focus on agriculture has, surprisingly, 
not prompted an expected emphasis on 
irrigation infrastructure and its management. 
In fact, according to Thuon et al. (2007), the 
water sector is expected to make its greatest 
contribution to economic growth and poverty 
alleviation through irrigated agriculture 
and domestic water supply. This is because 
agricultural production in Cambodia is closely 
related to climatic conditions (UNDP and 
Ministry of Environment 2011), where 81% 
of annual precipitation occurs during the 
wet season (May to October) with seasonal 
concentration of precipitation even higher 
in some areas, such as Kampong Chhnang 
Province (84%) (Chanrith n.d.). Most of the 
agricultural zones depend on rainfall, and 
production is blighted by uncertainty, a single 
crop per year and non-diversification of local 
farming systems. Consequently, if dry-season 
(December to February) production is to 
contribute to an expanded agricultural output, 
all the water required for growing rice during 
this period must be supplied through irrigation, 
according to the Cambodia Development 
Resource Institute (CDRI) (Chem et al. 2011). 
The Rectangular Strategy (RS) places particular 
emphasis on increasing the area of irrigated 
land, with the expectation that irrigation 
will make farmers less reliant on rainfall and 
allow them to cultivate more crops with more 
certainty and predictability, resulting in higher 
productivity and improved livelihoods (Tong 
et al. 2011). SAW also recognizes that most 
soils in the lowlands have low fertility and are 
used under rain-fed conditions with significant 
fluctuations in nutrient and water availability. 
Consequently, rice yields remain relatively low. 
Raising the productivity of lowland agriculture 
remains a significant objective, and substantial 
hope is invested in full and/or supplementary 
irrigation as the catalyst for intensification and 
diversification of lowland cropping systems. 
Consequently, the government has allocated 
about 35% of the total national budget to the 
irrigation sector for producing more water for 
agriculture (Sinath 2007).
Improving the management of water resources 
and irrigation will also be addressed under the 
Strategic Framework for Food Security and 
Nutrition in Cambodia (SFFSN) (2008–2012). 
The goal of SFFSN is that, “By 2012, poor and 
food-insecure Cambodians have substantially 
improved physical and economic access to 
sufficient, safe, and nutritious food to meet 
their dietary needs and food preferences for an 
active and healthy life” (RGC 2008). Irrigation, 
under this framework and in general, is 
targeted at reducing the dependency on rain-
fed farming and strengthening the resilience 
of poor food-insecure farmers, including their 
ability to cope with natural disasters such as 
floods and drought, and increasing rainfall 
variability. The drive to expand irrigation is 
underpinned by the belief that the use of water 
systems for agriculture is nowhere near its full 
potential, as Cambodian agriculture remains 
predominantly rain-fed with traditional farming 
techniques (Nou 2005). Other studies support 
the belief in the potential for significant yield 
improvements. For instance, Halcrow (1994) 
the poliCy lAndsCApe
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cited by (Chea 2010), estimates the yield 
from rain-fed cultivation to be lower than 
both wet-season cultivation supplemented 
by irrigation (73% higher) and dry-season 
irrigated cultivation (231% higher), suggesting 
that Cambodian agriculture is very responsive 
to irrigation. Consequently, investment in 
irrigation, including improvements in current 
irrigation systems and management, is among 
the top priorities of public investment in 
Cambodia (Yu and Diao 2010).
Amidst these many planned actions, the 
Policy Paper on the Promotion of Paddy Rice 
Production and Rice Export recognizes several 
factors that will determine the success of this 
policy which will apply to all the other policies 
and strategies discussed in this review:
•	 Paddy rice production is largely subject to 
weather conditions and climate change as 
well as the unpredictability of the Mekong 
River’s water level in the dry season.
•	 Higher oil prices will directly affect the 
production, processing and transport of rice 
and other products.
•	 The milled rice market is highly protected.
•	 Opening up of the milled rice markets to 
promote exports would cause an increase 
in domestic prices, and the traditional 
mechanism of food stocking will become 
weak, threatening national food security.
•	 The gains from these interventions may 
not be shared directly with farmers, if they 
are captured by middlemen, exporters 
and suppliers of agricultural inputs. Since 
farmers have limited capacity, training will 
be essential to ensure their concerns are 
addressed in a participatory way.
•	 Paddy rice development areas use high 
levels of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, 
and the destruction of forest and flooded 
forest to expand the cultivated land area, 
are risks to natural ecosystems and the 
services they provide.
•	 Implementation could be difficult and 
complicated due to ineffective coordination 
and unclear responsibility among 
implementing ministries/agencies. 
decentralization of irrigation 
management through participatory 
irrigation management and 
development (pimd)
Since 1994, the Cambodian Government has 
embarked on a program of transferring the 
responsibility of operation and maintenance 
(O&M) of irrigation schemes to FWUCs. The 
participatory irrigation management and 
development (PIMD) program was introduced 
in Cambodia to galvanize community 
participation in, and provide a sense of 
ownership of, irrigation schemes to achieve 
operational sustainability and economic 
development (at household and national 
levels) by improving system performance 
(Perera 2006). In 1999, PIMD was adopted as 
a formal policy with the Circular No. 1 on the 
Implementation Policy for Sustainable Irrigation 
Systems, which devolved responsibility for 
all aspects of irrigation scheme operation to 
FWUCs. Subsequently, farmer participation 
and the FWUC model were incorporated into 
the National Water Law as part of its formal 
PIMD strategy (Tong et al. 2011). The functions 
and responsibilities of the FWUCs can be 
summarized as follows: 
•	 prepare the community’s work plan 
•	 develop the statute, contract and 
community’s internal order 
•	 maintain the irrigation system in good 
condition for timely water allocation 
•	 manage and allocate water to community 
members
•	 increase the capacity of FWUC members on 
the use, maintenance and development of 
irrigation systems
•	 settle issues raised by community members 
•	 collect irrigation service fees (ISF) according 
to the agreed amount set by the community 
(Nang et al. 2011).  
The scope of these responsibilities 
encompasses the secondary and tertiary canal 
systems. At scheme scale, it should be noted 
that the reservoir and main canal fall under the 
direct responsibility of MoWRAM/PDoWRAM.
the poliCy lAndsCApe
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Once established and registered, a FWUC signs 
a management agreement with PDoWRAM 
outlining their roles and responsibilities, and 
indicating estimated ISF requirements. This is 
most commonly based on a template included 
in Circular No. 1 and, consequently, the 
mandated roles of FWUC are similar within each 
scheme (Chea et al. 2011). ISF collection is to be 
initially supported by the government, which 
begins by contributing 80% of the required ISF 
for O&M. This contribution is to decrease each 
year by 20% over 5 years. A third of the total 
ISF and any other funds received by the FWUC 
are to be allocated for emergency repair of the 
physical structure (Phallika 2012). Beyond these 
initial contributions to ISF, the role of PDoWRAM 
is limited to technical and managerial support, 
monitoring and evaluation, and other support 
needed by the FWUC.
As stated by Chea (2010), a remarkable amount 
of hope and expectation has been placed 
on this policy, when one considers that it is 
expected to: contribute significantly to the 
effective and sustainable management of 
irrigation systems, promote food security and 
economic growth; increase the role of farmers 
and ease the burden on the government, build 
local capacity to manage irrigation, and bring 
about uniformity and consistency among 
donor, government and non-governmental 
organization (NGO) strategies for irrigation 
development and management. Thuon et al. 
(2007) believe the international donors have 
had a major influence on the Cambodian 
government’s adoption of PIMD, in ridding 
the state of the fiscal burden of O&M of 
irrigation systems. Molle (2005) also notes 
the standardized and politically correct 
manner in which the then draft water policy 
affirms participation principles, suggesting a 
cookie-cutter approach to operationalizing 
participatory principles within a specific rural 
context.
In many cases, the FWUCs delegate tertiary 
canal management to the farmer water-user 
groups (FWUGs) whose rice fields cross such 
tertiary canals. As specified in Circular No. 1, 
FWUGs are FWUC subgroups and are normally 
led by the village chief (Nang et al. 2011). 
During wet- or dry-season rice cultivation, 
farmers are expected to report water demands 
to FWUG leaders who then ask the FWUC 
committee to release water from the secondary 
canal to the tertiary canal. When there are water 
shortages in the secondary canal, the relevant 
FWUC will contact PDoWRAM to release water 
from the main canal to the secondary canal. 
An example is the Stung Chinit scheme, where 
all matters related to such water allocations 
are discussed and solved during weekly 
or monthly meetings presided over by an 
external committee, of which the FWUCs, local 
authorities (LAs), district police and provincial 
departments (e.g. PDoWRAM, PDAFF and 
PDoE) are members. The external committee is 
presided over by the district governor (Nang et 
al. 2011).
the poliCy lAndsCApe
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In the previous section, an impressive array of 
policies, strategies and proposed investments 
were outlined, which provides an overview of 
the complex and diverse cross-sectoral and 
cross-disciplinary nature of the conditions 
necessary for meeting policy objectives. These 
commitments amount to a major financial 
and implementation challenge, especially in 
the case of the limited time frame of SAW. The 
actual implementation challenge can be better 
understood to consider current experiences 
from the field level, which is the intention of 
this and the following sections.
The consistent trend of improving production 
(Figure 1) in the period 2005–2009 is encouraging. 
Sothath and Sophal (2010) partly attribute this 
performance of irrigaTed rice producTion
to the expansion of cultivated areas and to 
improved productivity of paddy (Figure 2). On 
average, Cambodia’s rice yield has increased 
by 5.4% per year since 1994, from 1.6 t/ha in 
1994–1997, to 2.3 t/ha in 2003–2008. The wet-
season yields increased from 1.0 t/ha in 1994 to 
over 2.3 t/ha in 2008. This yield increase has been 
largely attributed to improvements in access to 
fertilizers and other inputs, rather than improved 
varieties of seeds (ACI and CamConsult 2006). 
The productivity figures for dry-season crops are 
higher than those of the wet season crops, mainly 
due to the use of higher-yielding seed varieties 
and improved water management during the dry 
season. In addition, it is easier for farmers to apply 
fertilizers and treat the land for better production 
during the dry season (Yu and Fan 2009).
Figure 1: Evolution of agricultural land use and production, 2000–2009
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Figure 2: Improvements in the productivity of paddy rice, 2000–2009
Source: Sothath and Sophal 2010 citing National Institute of Statistics and MAFF agricultural statistics for 2008
4.0
4.5
2.0
3.0
1.0
3.5
1.5
2.5
0.5
0.0
2000 20022001 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Wet season Dry season Total wet and dry season 
tons 
per ha
17
perForm
AnCe oF irrigAted riCe produCtion
Sothath and Sophal (2010) ascribe the 
contributions of improved seeds, farming 
techniques, fertilizers and irrigation for these 
improvements. Thuon et al. (2007) point out 
that improvements in the rural road and 
market infrastructure have provided better 
access facilities for farmers to their fields and to 
local markets. A study of the Trapaing Trabek 
irrigation scheme (Kampong Chhnang Province) 
by Phallika (2012) concludes that, through the 
provision of both public and private irrigation, 
agricultural productivity has significantly 
improved, especially due to the expansion of 
the dry-season rice cropping area and a large 
increase in rice yield (on average, 6 t/ha when 
there is water and with the use of fertilizer, 
according to Chea (2010)). Irrigated area has 
expanded for public (from 20 to 450 ha during 
1991–2010) and private (from 13 to 150 ha 
during 2006–2010) irrigation sources (Phallika 
2012). This has enabled farmers to sell surplus 
rice and obtain some cash to use as capital, 
which has contributed to household poverty 
reduction in the study area. Once the poorest 
of the 13 communes within Kantuot District, 
the residents of Kantuot commune have now 
become amongst the richest (Chea 2010). 
Before 1991, there was no dry-season rice since 
there was no irrigation system. Cultivation was 
limited to some recession agriculture using 
floating rice. Following the irrigation scheme, 
the area irrigated has expanded each year along 
with the demand for labor, which has drawn 
seasonal labor from other villages in the same or 
neighboring communes (Phallika 2012).
Similar examples are provided by other observers 
elsewhere. Thuon (2006) highlights Sdao Koang 
irrigation scheme in Prey Veng Province, where he 
finds that farmers recognize the improvements 
in their livelihoods. By increasing the average 
rice yield to 3 t/ha and also increasing fish 
availability in the irrigated paddy where farmers 
have fishponds, the scheme has enabled them 
to produce surplus rice for sale and the income 
is used to purchase tractors and pumps as well 
as televisions, which were almost absent prior 
to the scheme. In the Stung Chinit irrigation 
project, Thuon et al. (2007) reported that wet-
season paddy yield increased by 87% for 74 
out of 160 farmers. They attribute this to water 
availability and the use of fertilizer and new 
techniques. Others who had also diversified 
into vegetables and fruits expected watermelon 
production to double and vegetable production 
to increase by 50%. The total increase in income 
from farm products (paddy and other field crops) 
was KHR 500,000 (US$ 131) per family per year. 
Nevertheless, Thuon et al. (2007) note that the 
agro-economic impact is still low compared to 
the expected output put forward by the project 
proposal. 
In a study that covered nine villages representing 
all four of Cambodia’s main rural agroecological 
regions, CDRI (2012) demonstrated the potential 
for poverty reduction through agricultural 
growth. Krasang and Ba Baong villages 
experienced a sharp and sustained increase in 
agricultural income between 2001 and 2008. 
Farmers in these villages doubled or tripled their 
yields of wet- and dry-season rice in 2004/2005 
and 2008 compared with 2001. Combined 
with increases in income from wage labor in 
Krasang and increased returns from fishing in Ba 
Baong, only 8% of panel households in Krasang 
and 16% in Ba Baong were classed as ‘poor’ in 
2008. Adoption of modern farming techniques, 
particularly of the high-yielding rice variety IR66 
and chemical fertilizers, lie behind the large 
increases in rice yields while the reliable supply 
of water, increasing availability of microcredit 
and construction of rural roads were other key 
factors. The almost doubling of the price for 
paddy in 2008 (compared with 2004/2005) also 
helped increase income from surplus paddy, and 
encouraged farmers to change from subsistence 
farming to modern methods of farming. 
Intensification and diversification of agricultural 
production by growing cash crops, such as 
peanuts, green beans and corn, and raising 
livestock was observed in Ba Baong, Krasang, 
Khsach Chi Ros and Kompong Tnoat, which 
helped to improve both household nutrition and 
incomes. Following the adoption of the high-
yielding rice variety IR66, some areas, such as 
Khsach Chi Ros has become a dynamic  
dry-season rice-growing and surplus-producing 
area.
Nevertheless, Sothath and Sophal (2010) 
highlight the major role played by good 
weather/rainfall, which indicates an inherent 
vulnerability in Cambodia’s agriculture that 
remains to be addressed. The same authors also 
add floods or drought to the climatic factors 
that continue to undermine food (and income) 
security. In this respect, the role played by 
irrigation is critical in decreasing the impact of 
natural weather events and allowing average 
better productivity (TWGAW 2006a). 
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Furthermore, the government (RGC 2010a) 
recognized that farmers were not diversifying 
into high-value crops (e.g. off-season 
vegetables), and that agricultural production 
was based upon small, fragmented farms, 
which were producing primarily for subsistence 
needs. Farmers’ lack of familiarity and limited 
knowledge of non-rice crops as well as 
unpredictable rainfall, have led to the perception 
that diversifying from paddy to the cultivation 
of other crops is highly risky. Consequently, 
market infrastructure for non-rice crops is 
underdeveloped. In addition to the availability 
of water, there were other important factors that 
had affected farmers’ willingness to diversify 
from paddy to the cultivation of other crops, 
e.g. farm size; household head characteristics, 
including education and experience; resource 
endowment, especially farm assets and the 
number of plots occupied; markets; and the 
desire for higher incomes (Tong at al. 2011). 
This has led to some analysts (e.g. CARD, 2011) 
questioning how far small-scale food-insecure 
farmers are benefitting from recent investments 
in the agriculture and water sectors. Further 
reason to pose such a question arises in view of 
the government’s continued practice of granting 
large-scale economic land concessions (ELCs) 
to private sector investors under a sub-decree 
on ELCs (2005),5 which allows investors to 
obtain large amounts of land (up to 10,000 ha) 
for agricultural production and agro-industry 
development. Sothath and Sophal (2010) 
found that by April 2010, 87 ELCs had been 
granted (which cover more than 1 million ha), 
even though the Agriculture Sector Strategic 
Development Plan (ASSDP) 2006–2010 and SAW 
claim that they seek to support smallholder 
farmers over large-scale agriculture and call for a 
review of the ELC process (RGC 2010a).
Despite several examples of productivity 
and livelihood improvements following 
the introduction/rehabilitation of irrigation 
schemes, several observers consider agricultural 
productivity to be low, overall. Considering 
current irrigation performance, Thuon et al. 
(2007) conclude that, although Cambodia has 
more than 2,000 irrigation schemes which could 
potentially irrigate more than 1 million ha, most 
of these schemes are underperforming. Recent 
studies (ADB 2011a; ADB 2012a) found that 
agricultural productivity in Cambodia remains 
among the lowest in Asia and the Pacific (Figure 
3). In fact, and contrary to the assumption 
in current policies, a national survey carried 
out by the Cambodia Development Resource 
Institute (CDRI 2008) revealed that only 35% 
of Cambodian farm households produce a 
paddy rice surplus, and the rest produce less 
than required or just enough for consumption. 
This is significant, given that over 80% of the 
population relies on agriculture as their primary 
source of income and where rice constitutes 
90% of total agricultural output. Consequently, 
Sothath and Sophal (2010), through a study of 
1,070 households in 15 representative villages 
across Cambodia, suggest that 61% of the 
surveyed households in rural villages would 
encounter food insecurity during August–
October 2009. This is despite agricultural 
production generating a 3.5 million ton surplus 
in 2009, and being preceded by a steady rise in 
production, especially since 2005. 
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Figure 3: Productivity of paddy in Cambodia compared to other countries in the region
Source: Agricultural statistics, FAO 2008./ Source: ADB, 2012a, citing FAO, 2008.
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This section presents a range of diverse 
conditions and constraints that could have an 
effect on agricultural production, and highlights 
some of the realities shaping the broader 
context within which Cambodia’s agriculture 
and water and related development policies will 
be implemented. While scheme management, 
production and post-harvest issues are covered 
separately, in practice, farmers, especially small-
scale operators, are likely to be affected by a 
combination of factors. These occur at different 
stages of production, and form a continuum 
along the production and post-production 
stages. Nevertheless, in the literature reviewed, 
inadequate fertilizer use and underdeveloped 
irrigation facilities are seen as the most binding 
constraints to agricultural production. For 
example, a survey conducted by the Economic 
Institute of Cambodia (EIC) reveals that, for 
a majority of farmers, the top three factors 
affecting crop yields are: lack of an irrigation 
network; obsolete tools; and counterfeit, and 
high cost of, fertilizer. 
poor system design and management
While irrigation has certainly contributed 
to the productivity gains recorded in recent 
years, the literature and key policy documents 
on agriculture and irrigation suggest that 
this has occurred despite significant system 
inefficiencies, and serious questions were raised 
about their economic viability (ADB 2008a; 
CEDAC 2010). This section seeks to identify 
the diversity of factors shaping this status quo, 
with a view to identifying their implications on 
where future investments in irrigation should 
be directed.
Inherent geographical and biophysical 
challenges
The factors identified in this subsection are 
constraints to system functioning, but can 
be viewed as challenges to the effectiveness 
of system design and management in terms 
of how they cope with the limitations and 
uncertainties these factors bring about. 
This aspect will be discussed later on in this 
subsection.
Hydrology, geography and physical water scarcity 
What CDRI (2010) describe as Cambodia’s 
unique hydrologic regime has meant that 
some rivers have too much water flowing in 
the rainy season or too little water, if at all, 
in the dry season, when water is needed the 
most for irrigation. This water flow regime is 
less than ideal for the optimal operation of 
irrigation systems. Consequently, different 
parts of Cambodia are afflicted by physical and/
or economic water scarcity. Chea et al. (2011) 
provide the examples of Rolous (near Boeung 
Lies, Kampong Thom Province) and Damnak 
Ampil (DAP) in Pursat Province. In Rolous, water 
is physically scarce at the sub-scheme level in 
the northwestern region, while the scheme 
also suffers from economic scarcity through 
severely underdeveloped infrastructure. There 
is an intrinsic shortage of water in Damnak 
Ampil, where even upstream users feel that 
there is not enough water, while the absence 
of concrete canals between schemes makes 
distributing water from upstream schemes 
to DAP unfeasible. Allowing the water to flow 
through the river would result in substantial 
losses through infiltration and evaporation. 
Not only does physical water scarcity bring 
significant risks to crop production, especially 
during the dry season, it also poses a major 
challenge to the authority and credibility of 
FWUCs as farmers compete for water. CDRI 
(2010) observes another dimension to this 
problem in the expansion of the command area 
by farmers beyond what is technically feasible, 
often in defiance of FWUC and PDoWRAM 
advice, and cite the Trapaing Trabek and Pok 
Pen schemes as examples. 
problem analysis 
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The Stung Chinit Irrigation and Rural 
Infrastructure Project and the Northwest 
Irrigation Sector Project, ADB (2010) 
highlighted the fact that policy emphasis on 
irrigation is underwritten by the assumption 
that, because the country’s almost exclusive 
crop is paddy, timely water provision is 
critical to ensuring harvests and increasing 
production. The report points out that this flies 
in the face of Cambodia’s hydrological and 
geographical realities. Its landscape and water 
availability make it almost impossible to store 
and move irrigation water using conventional 
methods due to a flat terrain, sparse dry-
season rainfall, and the almost total absence 
of suitable landscapes for the construction of 
major structures to store wet-season water 
for use in the dry season. The need to ensure 
scarce dry-season water supplies for multiple 
uses (including domestic water supply) 
also acts as a constraint to the potential for 
irrigation in the country. The limited technical 
and institutional capacity of MoWRAM and 
PDoWRAMs further constrain the potential for 
any kind of sophisticated or complex irrigation 
development. 
Poor and variable soil quality
One of the factors limiting productivity of 
paddy is the fertility of soil (Sothath and 
Sophal 2010; ADB 2012a). Half of Cambodia’s 
agricultural land is classified as having poor 
quality soil, which is usually sandy and has only 
small quantities of nutrients. As a result, farmers 
have to incur higher production costs (more 
seed and fertilizer) for paddy cultivation. In 
fact, UNDP and Ministry of Environment (2011) 
noted that questions persist with regard to the 
viability of irrigation under such soil conditions.
Climate variability
According to Chea et al. (2011), water shortages 
have been a serious issue for farmers in Pursat 
(DAP scheme), where periods of drought 
have occurred in the wet season in the last 
few years and are becoming longer each year. 
This is forcing farmers with fields far from the 
irrigation canals to resort to pumping water to 
supplement rainfall. While this strategy helps 
mitigate crop losses, it can significantly erode 
farmers’ profits, given the higher costs involved 
compared to irrigation water (discussed 
below). According to UNDP and Ministry of 
Environment (2011), predictions suggest that 
wet seasons will be shorter but with higher 
levels of rainfall and dry seasons will be longer 
and drier, resulting in intra-country shifts in 
the distribution of rainfall. The changes to the 
length of seasons, combined with the delayed 
onset of the wet season after a longer dry 
season, will affect traditional cropping practices 
and is expected to reduce rice yields (under 
both high and low emission scenarios) by at 
least 20% and increasing to as much as 70% 
of current production (UNDP and Ministry of 
Environment 2011). The field dialogues with 
farmers undertaken by IWMI in the Kamping 
Pouy and Boeng Sne irrigation schemes 
in Battambang and Prey Veng provinces, 
respectively (de Silva and Senaratna-Sellamuttu 
2012), further support the growing concern 
amongst farmers over rainfall uncertainty and 
its influence on their choices of rice varieties 
and cropping patterns. 
Unsuitable system design and poor quality 
of construction
An assessment of 2,525 irrigation schemes 
across 13 provinces by CEDAC (2009) found that 
only 23% functioned during the dry season, 
49% functioned during the wet season, and 
23% functioned during both seasons. The 
study also classified the schemes into three 
categories: well-functioning, functioning and 
not functioning. The classification was based on 
the quality of the reservoir, dam, structures and 
distribution network. Those schemes that were 
at least 60% in line with the original design 
were categorized as well-functioning, 40% 
to 60% in line with the original design were 
functioning and less than 40% who were in line 
with the original design were considered as 
non-functioning. The results showed that of the 
2,525 schemes, only 6% were functioning well, 
32% were functioning partially and 62% were 
non-functioning. CEDAC (2010) concluded that 
more than 2,400 schemes needed rehabilitation 
or reconstruction.
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A common cause of operational problems 
in irrigation schemes is the way they were 
designed and/or constructed (CDRI 2010). Some 
of the schemes date back to the Angkorian 
period (Chea 2010), while many others were 
misconceived under the Pol Pot regime during 
the latter half of the 1970s. Chea et al. (2011) 
found that most schemes were not designed 
to cope in a context where physical scarcity 
in the dry season is a growing issue, with 
increased double-cropping taking place, as 
most schemes were originally designed and 
built for wet-season supplementary irrigation 
only. Therefore, the schemes cannot maintain 
enough water during the wet season for use 
in the dry season (CDRI 2010). Flawed designs 
in relation to hydrological and geographical 
realities have contributed to several existing 
schemes frequently being in disrepair, where 
failure is already built into the design and/
or construction (Irrigation Development in 
Cambodia in 2011).6
Consequently, according to Perera (2006), such 
irrigation schemes simply cannot provide better 
services because of their faulty design, and this 
is true particularly of the systems built during 
the Pol Pot regime, which account for 69% of 
total irrigation systems. This leads to water 
scarcity and conflicts arising from the inability 
to distribute allocated water to all of the 
farmers within the scheme (Perera 2006; Vuthy 
and Ra 2010), cross-scheme conflict  
(Box 3) and differences in crop productivity and 
food security and incomes. Poor distribution 
infrastructure forces farmers to irrigate 
from plot to plot, which wastes water and 
contributes to water shortages downstream 
(Chem and Someth 2011).
Thuon et al. (2007) emphasize the importance 
of a sound design to withstand high annual 
rainfall and floods. They compare and contrast 
the ‘modern’ irrigation schemes in this respect 
to the traditional wet season flood-recession 
paddy cultivation that has been adapted to 
this reality. They argue that if new schemes are 
to be sustainable, they should be designed to 
withstand annual floods and high rainfall levels, 
or the annual O&M costs for system repair 
and improvement would remain beyond the 
capacity of the ordinary farmers. 
Box 3. Cross-scheme conflict
Quoting Chea et al. (2011): 
The situation in Rolous demonstrates the 
coordination struggles and conflicts that 
arise over water allocation at sub-scheme 
level, between upstream and downstream 
water users with differing water needs. The 
environmental issues are annual flooding 
of Rolous and Sroyov areas, which began 
to occur after the renovation of the Rolous 
irrigation dam, and poor water allocation 
at the command area. These have been the 
primary causes of conflict between farmers. 
There are essentially four groups of water 
users in the Rolous scheme, which require 
water at different times of the year and in 
different quantities. The first group consists 
of O Kunthor farmers living to the east of the 
main, privately owned, canal near Boeung 
Lies. The second group comprises farmers 
living and farming near Rolous village in 
the southwest. The third group consists of 
the private fishing lot owners operating in 
Prek Sbov stream and the fourth includes 
those farmers with fields in the central 
to northeast region of the scheme. The 
irrigation infrastructure does not meet the 
quantity, or the temporal demands of these 
four water user groups. Every year, the 
FWUC committee, with the support of the 
CC and PDoWRAM, has lobbied the FWUC 
farmers to discuss and negotiate water 
allocation strategies for the wet season. 
However, the actual beneficial outcomes 
of these efforts had been few, especially 
for the farmers in the Rolous village area 
whose problems cannot be solved without 
fundamental redevelopment of the scheme’s 
infrastructure.
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Sothath and Sophal (2010) found that lack of 
water in the irrigation system was reported as 
being a problem by 85% of farm households in 
Takeo and Kandal provinces. Another 48% and 
39%, respectively, complained about the lack 
of distribution systems and the lack of water 
diversion systems in existing irrigation schemes. 
They conclude that secondary and tertiary 
canals were often not complemented, and the 
inadequate availability of water in the main 
canals was common (ADB 2008a). Others have 
noted an absence of drainage network and a 
large capacity of canals compared to the area 
irrigated (MoWRAM n.d.). This was also verified 
by IWMI’s fieldwork (de Silva and Senaratna-
Sellamuttu 2012) in the Kamping Pouy and 
Boeng Sne irrigation schemes, respectively, 
where both schemes which originated from the 
Pol Pot era, have been restored and extended 
in a piecemeal fashion which has left the 
secondary and tertiary canals incomplete. 
Consequently, according to JICA (2011), of the 
approximately 2.25 million ha of paddy fields 
in Cambodia (2008 figures), approximately 
580,000 ha (or 26% of this area) were irrigated. 
Nang et al. (2011) present the lack of 
community involvement in decision-making 
processes about irrigation development 
projects (e.g. schemes in Kampong Chhnang 
and Pursat Provinces), including initial appraisal, 
planning, implementation, and monitoring 
and evaluation, as another reason for poor 
system design. This has discouraged farmers 
from meaningful participating in FWUCs. 
According to Thuon et al. (2007), in Stung 
Chinit, problems related to canal improvement, 
such as designing narrow bridges, crosscutting 
the ox-cart tracks and lack of cattle crossing 
across the field channel, could have been 
avoided if community and local leaders had 
been consulted earlier. According to CDRI 
(2008), some of the schemes were built without 
the participation of key local stakeholders in 
the early stages of design and development, 
and their reservoirs were built at a level lower 
than the main canal, which prevented water 
flowing into the canal. Farmers were not willing 
to participate in the O&M of the schemes once 
they were handed over to them.
Expensive and unregulated private pumping 
due to geography, physical water scarcity 
and poor system design
Another consequence of water scarcity and 
poor system design is the prevalence of 
pumping of water from perennial watercourses 
and lakes, groundwater or dug ponds (CDRI 
2008) in the absence of irrigation water. This 
takes various forms, including state-supplied 
pumps, cheap portable pumps used by 
individual farmers, and large pumping stations 
owned and operated by private businesses. The 
Trapaing Trabek irrigation scheme (Kampong 
Chhnang Province), for instance, cannot be 
expanded due to a landscape unsuited to 
gravity-fed irrigation, and thus exposition of 
irrigated area is based on pumping water from 
a nearby lake (Phallika 2012).
The RGC encourages such strategies because 
it provides rapid access to water for individual 
farmers. However, there is little regulation 
in place to avoid exploitation, especially of 
aquifers. Moreover, Sinath (2007) concluded 
that the experience in Cambodia with fixed 
pump schemes has been disappointing for a 
number of reasons. These include: inadequate 
water sources, siltation, over-dimensioning of 
pumps, use of fuel-inefficient Soviet-designed 
pumps, and high maintenance costs. Although 
the capital costs of pumped abstraction tend to 
be less than for gravity diversion, annual O&M 
costs for pump stations are significantly higher—
about US$ 80/ha/year against US$ 20–25/ha/year 
for gravity irrigation schemes. In the Trapaing 
Trabek irrigation scheme, for example, Phallika 
(2012) reports that the water fee charged by the 
privately run pumping station is about 17–20 
times higher than the ISF charged by the FWUC: 
US$ 87.5–100 (private) versus US$ 5–7.5 (FWUC). 
What is interesting is the inelasticity in demand 
between different household income categories, 
since farmers with land closer to the pumping 
station and invariably further from areas 
served by the irrigation canals had little choice. 
Although Phallika (2012) has not addressed 
this, it may be fair to assume that this additional 
production cost falls disproportionately on 
the poorer households, as they are more likely 
to own the more marginalized land within 
a scheme. If this is the case, the potentially 
negative impact on the poverty reduction 
objective of providing irrigation water is clear.
23
problem
 AnAlysis 
Underlying the cost of pumped water, is the 
absence of a clear regulatory framework for the 
establishment, operation and pricing involved 
in privately pumped water. In the above 
example, Phallika (2012) observes the informality 
characterizing the commencement and operation 
of the pumping station where the commune 
chief had approached a business-owner he knew 
and suggested that he start such a venture. Thus, 
the same author notes that none of the rules 
(e.g. registration, licensing) and charges (licence 
fees, taxes) applicable to creation of other private 
enterprises applies in practice to such schemes. 
The water fee is based on the petroleum cost in 
the market in the province, and the costs involved 
in the logistics to be managed by the pump 
operator. This involves an outlay of between US$ 
3,000–4,000 for petroleum before the water fee 
is collected at the end of the harvesting period. 
The lack of rules also adversely affects the pump 
owner, since he has no recourse to a formal 
mechanism (such as a supply agreement) to 
collect the water fees when some farmers default, 
especially when they have suffered poor yields. 
Poor performance of FWUCs in the operation 
and maintenance of irrigation schemes 
The poor operation and maintenance has been 
highlighted as a weak point in nearly all the 
irrigation schemes visited by MoWRAM.  
As Perera (2006) recognized, implementing 
PIMD in Cambodia under many existing 
unfavorable conditions, including high levels 
of poverty, low agricultural productivity and 
deteriorated irrigation systems with frequently 
poor design, is a very difficult task. This 
observation seems to predict the finding by 
CEDAC (2009) that, only 230 (6.3%) out of 2,525 
irrigation schemes across 13 provinces had a 
FWUC (Table 2), and of those 230, only four (2%) 
could be considered to be functioning well, 
though another 84 (36%) had the potential to 
do so, with the majority (62%) found to be non 
functional (Table 3).7 Nang et al. (2011) found 
that, at a scheme level, the overall achievement 
of the primary purpose of FWUCs in managing, 
maintaining and operating small- and medium-
scale irrigation schemes in a sustainable 
Table 2: FWUC inventory from 13 provinces
No. Province Total number of irrigation schemes Total number of FWUC No. FWUC
1 Kampong Thom 488 39 449
2 Banteay Mancheay 94 28 71
3 Batambang 132 6 131
4 Pusat 57 9 50
5 Kampong Chhang 101 18 95
6 Prey Veng 261 27 234
7 Siem Reap 250 10 247
8 Svay Rieng 28 11 18
9 Kampot 45 6 40
10 Kampong Speu 374 22 368
11 Takeo 244 17 228
12 Kandal 108 6 104
13 Kampong Cham 343 31 331
2,525 230 2,366
Source: CEDAC 2009
Table 3: FWUC performance
No. Province Total FWUC FWUC function well FWUC could function  FWUC does not function
1 Kampong Thom 39 1 9 29
2 Banteay Mancheay 28 1 2 25
3 Batambang 6 1 5
4 Pusat 9 5 4
5 Kampong Chhang 18 6 12
6 Prey Veng 27 27
7 Siem Reap 10 3 7
8 Svay Rieng 11 3 7
9 Kampot 6 1 2 3
10 Kampong Speu 22 1 5 16
11 Takeo 17 16 1
12 Kandal 6 4 2
13 Kampong Cham 31 3 28
230 4 84 142
Source: CEDAC 2009
24
manner was not being reached. Village-level 
findings indicated a significant disparity between 
the formally granted mandate to FWUCs and 
their effectiveness, including their difficulties 
in collecting ISF. Chea et al. (2011) found that, 
across case study schemes, FWUCs acted as 
a mediator between farmers and PDoWRAM, 
rather than carrying out their principal mandate 
of competently managing the schemes. They 
found that the performance of key tasks such as: 
maintaining infrastructure, allocating water from 
primary and secondary canals, and collecting 
irrigation service fees, were inconsistent and often 
absent. Many farmers who grow dry-season rice 
did not have irrigated water. The lack of irrigated 
water is due to a lack of water and irrigation 
infrastructure in the catchment, and a proper 
water allocation mechanism. Consequently, the 
allocation of irrigation water between different 
irrigation schemes and between users within the 
same scheme was not timely or equitable. This 
created intense competition over water (Chem 
and Someth 2011). Chea et al. (2011) concluded 
that the current governance arrangements 
deviate from the requirements imposed by the 
physical configuration of the schemes and the 
idealized theoretical governance purported in the 
PIMD policies.
The reasons for this situation are multiple, and 
although these are discussed individually below, 
many are mutually reinforcing circumstances.
Inability to maintain the physical system
FWUCs do not have the financial capacity to 
undertake large-scale repairs. Sometimes, 
even routine maintenance is not carried out 
due to lack of funds (MoWRAM n.d.). There is a 
general inability to collect the ISF required to 
cover full O&M of the system. FWUCs collect 
a small proportion of ISFs, with only 45% of 
the infrastructure benefitting from some kind 
of routine maintenance (TWGAW 2006b), and 
the objectives of PIMD are not being achieved 
in many areas (CDRI 2008). Nang et al. (2011) 
concluded that given the general condition of 
the irrigation schemes, the current PIMD cannot 
encourage farmers to pay the water service fees 
or in participate in the O&M due to the lack of, 
or poorly constructed, infrastructure as well 
as other factors influencing the profitability of 
farming. A common sentiment expressed by 
farmers is that they do not want to pay ISFs if 
they did not benefit directly from the scheme. 
CDRI, CARD and IFPRI (2011) found that farmers 
are sensitive to any changes in water fees. 
Estimates of the extra yield produced as a result 
of irrigation, when measured in terms of rice 
production, are very low—a 1% increase in the 
amount of water used increased rice yield by 
only 0.06% in the wet season and 0.12% in the 
dry season (Figure 4). For amounts of water 
larger than 1,000 cubic meters (m3) per plot 
(controlling for other inputs), very little is added 
to yield size. These results led to the overall 
findings that raising water fees ‘too much’ will 
not lead to increased revenue for FWUCs, and 
farmers are acutely sensitive to changes in water 
fees above a relatively low value.
Chea et al. (2011) noted that local people 
misunderstood the purpose of water user fees 
and this was another reason for the failure in ISF 
collection. Since ISF is commonly translated into 
Khmer as ‘water fee’ rather than ‘infrastructure 
fee’, they suggest that Cambodian farmers 
actually believe they are being asked to pay 
for water rather than for the upkeep of the 
infrastructure necessary to supply the water. 
They cite farmers from DAP who claimed that 
Cambodians have never had to pay for water 
to grow rice, and they believed that they could 
get sufficient water from rainfall without having 
to pay the ISF. Similar views were found by 
Phallika (2012) in the Trapaing Trabek irrigation 
scheme (Kampong Chhnang Province), where 
the level of participation in O&M is still marginal 
and the FWUC struggles to collect the ISF, since 
water has always been viewed as a free resource 
and, traditionally farmers have never paid for 
irrigation water.
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Figure 4: Marginal productivity of irrigation 
water 
Source: Wokker et al. 2011
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However, the determining factor appears to 
be the cost-benefit equation. As Thuon et 
al. (2007) put it, it is highly improbable that 
the farmers would be ready to bear the high 
operation and maintenance costs unless the 
scheme can generate a substantial increase in 
farmers’ incomes and other tangible benefits. 
The FWUC in the Stung Chinit irrigation scheme 
would increase the ISF from KHR 30,000 to KHR 
60,000 ha/year (approximately US$ 15), since 
the ISF collected could only support 50–60% of 
O&M costs. This, however, is not feasible since 
farmers are unlikely to pay a higher ISF while 
their rice production remains at the same level 
(CDRI 2008). The situation is similar in many 
other schemes, including the Tuk Chhar system 
(Kampong Cham Province), where ISF collection 
falls below the O&M budget and fees are already 
high while yields remain low (Thuon et al. 2007). 
Moreover, the situation is likely to worsen as a 
scheme ages, as illustrated by Thuon (2006) by 
the Sdao Koang irrigation scheme (Prey Veng 
Province). In this scheme, although the FWUC 
was well managed and at least 93% of ISF was 
paid, its long-term sustainability depends on the 
ability to increase the ISF to support impending 
repairs to broken water gates and broken canals 
and replacement of the aging pump. While 
farmers hold the poor quality of construction 
as being responsible for this, the burden falls 
squarely on them after PIMD. 
As a consequence of inadequate ISF collection, 
FWUCs remain dependent on the commune 
support fund (approximately KHR 7 million 
for 2008–2009) and emergency funds from 
PDoWRAM (CDRI 2008), other state agencies 
(LAs; PDAFF; Provincial Department of Rural 
Development (PDRD); Provincial Department 
of Land Management, Urban Planning and 
Construction; PDoE; and PFiA) as well as 
NGOs and donors for maintenance of the 
scheme (Nang et al. 2011). The government 
recognizes that it is necessary that MoWRAM, 
through PDoWRAM, provides more assistance 
(financially, technically and in ISF collection) 
to FWUCs (MoWRAM n.d.); that the sharing 
of O&M responsibilities between MoWRAM 
and the FWUCs is rarely clarified; and that 
MoWRAM’s maintenance budget for irrigation 
infrastructure is insufficient (RGC 2010a).
In addition to the issue of finance, Thuon et 
al. (2007) point out that the canal system and 
associated operational practices of modern 
irrigation schemes are new and complicated 
for farmers. Construction of drainage canals 
using a new design system is a new concept 
in Cambodia. If the drainage canals lack 
proper maintenance, which is the farmer’s 
responsibility, they would soon disappear, 
resulting in failure of the scheme. Farmers are 
often unable to appreciate the importance of 
regular maintenance of the modern irrigation 
schemes. Their high maintenance costs means 
that some farmers think that the irrigation 
systems built during the Pol Pot regime were 
better as they were simple and easy to operate 
and maintain (Thuon et al. 2007). 
Lack of legitimacy
In theory, FWUCs have a legitimate role in 
managing irrigation water, but do not have 
the power to regulate and manage water 
resources. It was observed that at scheme and 
catchment levels, the legal and administrative 
responsibilities of the FWUCs over the irrigation 
scheme is not effective for many reasons, 
including limited power and authority, limited 
support funds (as discussed above), inadequate 
capacity, and lack of human resources. 
Additionally, there are few accountability 
mechanisms in the FWUC governance 
structure, resulting in low levels of trust and 
poor public service delivery for most farmers 
and their neighboring FWUCs (upstream and 
downstream). In many schemes (Taing Krasaing, 
Wat Leap and Kampang), FWUC committees 
have abandoned their duties and even their 
interests (rice fields) which fall within the 
scheme (Nang et al. 2011).
Questions of legitimacy of the FWUCs arise 
early and are caused by difficulties and delays 
in FWUC registration.8 According to Nang et 
al. (2011), some FWUCs reported having to 
wait several months or years to receive formal 
government recognition. Chea et al. (2011) 
found that recognition of FWUC legitimacy was 
strongest at PDoWRAM level, while villagers 
and MoWRAM did not always fully recognize 
the FWUC as a legitimate governance body. 
They cite the Rolous scheme, which, despite 
having an operational FWUC since 2004, has not 
been registered with MoWRAM. Consequently, 
some farmers had little trust in the FWUC’s 
ability to manage the scheme. 
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Inability to exercise authority and loss of 
independence
Inability to exercise authority and loss of 
independence is a fundamental problem with 
multiple causes, many of which are mutually 
reinforcing. Chea et al. (2011) note that farmers’ 
perception of the technical capacity of their 
FWUC is important, and is influenced by the 
infrastructural limitations of the scheme. 
These limitations lead to cyclical problems of 
water delivery, causing poor ISF collection and 
then degrading infrastructure which lead to 
further delivery issues, and so on. The failure to 
respond quickly and adequately to the urgent 
need to repair infrastructure damaged by the 
Ketsana storm in Rolous in 2009 created distrust 
amongst a number of farmers (Chea et al. 2011).
Undermined authority results in the inability 
to enforce system operation rules. Nang et 
al. (2011) found that releasing water without 
authorization and damaging canals or 
building small dams for fishing were the most 
common illegal activities. They point out that 
despite being independent organizations 
with a mandate to coordinate and facilitate 
local water-related issues, FWUCs lack formal 
conflict resolution powers, and cannot take 
any measures against non compliant farmers. 
Their role is merely to inform the LA, in the 
hope that some enforcement measures may 
be taken. In  O Svay scheme (Kampong Thom 
Province), the FWUC is mandated to allocate 
water and to coordinate with the LA, which 
by virtue of the law, is empowered to punish 
illegal activities in irrigation schemes (Nang et 
al. 2011). Failure to coordinate with the LA has 
meant that the FWUC cannot enforce its rules 
on allocation and this has caused farmers to 
be less interested in participating in the FWUC, 
turning instead to commune councils to solve 
any water-use conflicts. These aspects reach 
a critical point during times of water scarcity 
when beneficiaries, facing crop losses and 
financial ruin, prioritize their individual interests 
over group interests (Nang et al. 2011). Such 
scenarios further emphasize the lack of more 
strategic planning by the FWUCs in relation to 
water allocation over longer periods of time 
(e.g. entire cropping seasons), which could 
mitigate the chaos sparked by unexpected 
water scarcity.
Nang et al. (2011) also found that FWUC 
independence is further weakened by their 
dependence on local political actors. In the 
Kampang scheme in Pursat Province, the FWUC 
relied on the commune council to perform 
some of its water management duties, as the 
committee members were too busy with other 
(non-water related) matters. Perera (2006) found 
that most FWUC activities were implemented 
under the direction of the commune chief. 
These informal governance arrangements 
undermine the independence that FWUCs are 
meant to have when managing local water 
resources. A lack of human resources and 
technical capacity are major reasons for this. 
Nang et al. (2011) found that according to FWUC 
members in many of the studied schemes of 
the three provinces (Kampong Chhnang, Pursat 
and Kampong Thom), FWUCs and farmers 
still rely on the coordination or support of 
local political hierarchies, including commune 
councils, district authorities and line agencies, 
to make important decisions. They found that 
FWUCs only wield real influence from within 
the commune council framework rather than 
independently of it. For example, in Svay Check 
scheme of Kampong Thom Province, the village 
chief was selected as the first vice chairman 
of the FWUC. In the Rolous, Stung Chinit and 
Damnak Ampil schemes, Chea et al. (2011) 
found that farmers reported issues on water 
allocation, infrastructure and conflicts to their 
FWUC, which would usually report the problem 
to PDoWRAM, which would design a solution 
and feed instructions back to the FWUC. They 
found that the FWUCs held little authority 
within their respective schemes, and were not 
fully aware of the extent of their mandate, 
especially in relation to that of the commune 
councils. Consequently, considerable diffusion 
of responsibility was observed, both among 
FWUC members and commune councils. In 
addition to their practical deficiencies, FWUCs 
struggle to operate within the firmly embedded, 
pre-existing traditional governance structure 
and the cultural patron-client hierarchy. Another 
example is provided by Phallika (2012) in the 
Trapaing Trabek irrigation scheme, where 
the proposal of the FWUC committee for 
the irrigation system extension (excavating 
Trapaing Veng reservoir) to be integrated into 
the communal planning was not approved by 
the commune chief. This further illustrates that 
FWUCs are effectively not independent.
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While recognizing that the mixing of political 
figures (commune council members, village 
heads) and FWUCs can blur the distinction 
between the “state” and the non-state 
community based institution, Nang et al. 
(2011) believe that in the current situation, 
and considering that deference to political 
and administrative power is embedded in 
Cambodian society, this approach is valid for 
bolstering the otherwise weak authority of 
FWUCs. Their view appears to be supported 
by Phallika (2012), who deems that building 
relationships between FWUCs and commune 
chiefs is important, as it is the latter who 
determine the investments for socioeconomic 
growth in the area. These examples also 
suggest that in an attempt to introduce greater 
decentralization and deconcentration (D&D), 
the institutional structure introduced to give 
expression to these objectives have merely 
shifted the concentration of decision-making 
to a lower level of the political structure (i.e. the 
commune chief ).  
Lack of planning and coordination at scheme level
The Cambodian government’s Technical 
Working Group on Agriculture and Water 
(TWGAW 2006a) ascribed the poor water 
management observed in many schemes to a 
lack of a proper operation plans for optimizing 
water allocation and ensuring O&M for timely 
delivery. In other cases, operation plans were 
available but were not used. In these cases, 
water was managed on a daily basis, with 
service quality differing from one user to 
another. This was not helped by the often 
absent tertiary canals, and the insufficient 
number of distribution structures (e.g. gates, 
stop logs and culverts). Consequently, the 
FWUCs were not involved in allocation, and 
there were few rules or regulations about 
water supply to rice fields, and where they 
did exist, farmers paid little attention to those 
rules (CDRI 2010). The result was two scales 
of local conflicts according to Chea et al. 
(2011): between neighboring farmers, and 
between farmers from the upper and lower 
regions of the same scheme. Coordination 
and collaboration between farmers was often 
inhibited as farmers who shared adjacent rice 
paddies often came from different villages 
and communes that were several kilometers 
apart. It was reported that this situation makes 
it difficult for farmers to develop camaraderie 
and mutual trust, and to amicably resolve issues 
about their rice paddies. In other cases, some 
farmers prevented other farmers, whose land 
was further away from the water, from having 
access to water by not allowing them to run a 
pipe through their land (CDRI 2010). The overall 
challenges of collective planning can be seen in 
the case of the Damnak Ampil irrigation scheme 
(Kampong Speu Province), where beneficiaries 
are from seven communes and information–
sharing among them is difficult due to the 
geographic area involved, poor infrastructure 
and lack of financial resources to support all the 
FWUGs to come together for meetings (Nang 
et al. 2011). In the Kamping Puoy scheme, the 
FWUC has 64 members divided into 15 groups, 
each of which covers about 400 households. In 
addition to variations in conditions and needs, 
FWUC members must travel long distances to 
participate in regularly scheduled meetings 
and they were not compensated for their travel 
costs. Not surprisingly, CDRI (2010) found that, 
in Kamping Puoy, attendance has fallen in the 
face of farmer apathy and the lack of incentives 
to convene and attend meetings. 
The level of complexity is increased when 
there are many kinds of local institutions with 
links to water use, such as the Stung Chinit 
irrigation scheme, which includes agricultural 
communities (e.g. Dry Season Rice Association) 
under PDAFF and the Village Development 
Communities under PDRD (Nang et al. 2011). 
While scale clearly provides a significant 
organizational challenge to FWUCs, small- 
and medium-scale irrigation systems may 
face limitations in economic efficiencies to 
meet export-oriented production (UNDP 
and Ministry of Environment 2011). In light 
of the government’s emphasis on export of 
processed rice, this suggests the emergence 
of a paradox, where smaller schemes may 
be more manageable for FWUCs, but less 
effective in meeting national rice production 
targets. According to CDRI (2010), different 
schedules for water demand create a problem 
of coordination of rice planting, and this is more 
pronounced in larger schemes where the larger 
area tends to contain different soils that involve 
different rice varieties.
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Many observers (CDRI 2008; Vuthy and Ra 
2010) see this as a capacity issue due to a 
lack of training on irrigation infrastructure 
maintenance and lack of support from 
PDoWRAM. FWUC leaders and members are 
not equipped with enough technical training 
or financial capital to repair, develop and 
maintain infrastructure across the schemes, 
which in two out of three cases were greater 
than 100 ha. Investigations carried out by 
Chea et al. (2011) found that many FWUCs 
consisted of fewer than 10 people and, in 
practice, there were generally five or less active 
FWUC members. Although the PIMD policy 
paper requires FWUGs to support FWUCs in 
dealing with minor problems (i.e. individual rice 
fields and tertiary canals), FWUGs were often 
found to exist only in name and provided no 
coordinated function. Due to the large physical 
scale of schemes, some regions within the 
schemes were given little or no attention by 
the FWUCs, which was most notably so in the 
southwestern region of Rolous where farmers’ 
trust in the FWUC’s commitment to scheme 
management was consequently low. Although 
the low management capacity of FWUCs 
requires more assistance from PDoWRAM, this 
did not materialize, as PDoWRAM lack financial 
and technical capacity (Chem and Someth 
2011). Nang et al. (2011) and Chea et al. (2011) 
recommend training programs for farmers that 
include water law, policy, and the FWUC statute 
and their related responsibilities, so that farmers 
can understand the responsibilities of, and tasks 
entrusted to, FWUCs. Such information is still 
not clear, even among the FWUC members. 
The difficult economic conditions and the lack 
of financial compensation also undermine 
coordination activities. Nang et al. (2011) found 
that, due to difficulties in their living conditions 
and low levels of coordination among FWUGs 
and farmers, many established FWUG members. 
have given up their roles. According to Thuon 
et al. (2007), a similar situation appears to exist 
with the FWUC members. They noted that in 
Stung Chinit, the main office-holders of the 
FWUC were being paid a monthly allowance by 
donor-funded projects or the state and question 
whether the farmers would be able, or willing, 
to bear the cost of maintaining the FWUC 
committee after the withdrawal of the project.
Underdeveloped participation and lack of 
ownership
The conceptualization of participation, by both 
policymakers and the participants, and the 
process of participation, influence how FWUCs 
function and discharge their planning and 
management responsibilities. The literature 
reviewed presents a consistent picture of 
relatively low levels of participation across 
the schemes covered by the various studies. 
‘Participation’ here refers to both payment of 
ISF as well as involvement in decision-making 
about scheme management (e.g. O&M, water 
allocation), in terms of long-term planning or 
dealing with emergencies such as unexpected 
water scarcity. For instance, Phallika (2012) 
found that, in Trapaing Trabek, farmers only 
view and participate in FWUC meetings to 
know whether water will be available, and to 
make the FWUC aware of their problems related 
to irrigation, with the expectation that the 
FWUC will deal with these issues. Other forms 
of participation included payment of ISF, and 
providing labor and materials for secondary or 
tertiary canal O&M (Figure 5), while the idea 
of participating in making these decisions was 
not a common perception among farmers. 
This passive form of participation could be 
placed between rungs 3 (informing) and 4 
(consultation) in Arnstein’s ladder of citizen 
participation (Arnstein 1969) (Figure 6). Even 
this level of participation was found to be 
absent in some schemes such as Rolous, Stung 
Chinit and Damnak Ampil, where farmers 
lacked a sense of ownership and responsibility 
for the scheme’s infrastructure, as they believed 
that it was the FWUC’s role to attend to such 
tasks (Chea et al. 2011). 
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In seeking reasons for this status quo, different 
perceptions of water, a lack of understanding 
of higher forms of participation and dominance 
of the FWUC, and other leaderships linked to 
strong cultural and historical norms, emerge 
frequently in the literature, often in mutual 
reinforcement. These operate together with 
discontentedness amongst farmers because 
they were not involved in the formation of the 
FWUC (Chea 2010), and/or the scheme has 
failed to live up to its expectations, reasonable 
or otherwise. Thus, many observers, including 
Chea et al. (2011) and Phallika (2012), found 
that ISF is difficult to collect, partly because 
water has been traditionally viewed as a free 
resource and farmers believe that what they 
are actually paying for is the maintenance of 
the associated infrastructure. An example of 
dominance by the FWUC Chairman is provided 
by Phallika (2012) in Trapaing Trabek, where 
a majority of farmers are members of the 
FWUC, but they only follow and accede to the 
ideas put forward by the FWUC committee 
and particularly the chairman. The chairman 
developed the management master plan 
for irrigation expansion without inputs from 
his fellow members of the FWUC, due, it is 
stated, to inadequate technical knowledge 
related to hydrology, irrigation management, 
environment, policy planning and financial 
management within the FWUC committee. A 
similar process was observed by Chea (2010) 
when the commune council called people 
from a private pumping station to discuss 
the irrigation water fees. Instead of having a 
discussion, the people present were told what 
the fees would be. Development decisions were 
generally made either by the commune, where 
the chief dominated, and the owner of the 
pumping station. 
Figure 5: Distribution of activities carried out by participating farmers in Roung FWUC 
 (Kampong Speu Province)
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These observations suggest that institutions 
such as FWUCs and commune councils sanction 
the exercise of power by a single or a few 
individuals, rather than spreading the decision-
making power across the community. The 
operation of traditional norms and attitudes 
towards leadership is an additional and 
powerful condition, which makes this possible. 
As explained by Chea (2010), the cultural 
understanding of participation in Cambodia 
lacks the core essence of the concept, as 
defined by scholars in community based natural 
resource management (CBNRM): “the coming 
together of local people to define priorities and 
develop rules and policies in the community, 
to implement rules and to enforce rules.” Chea 
observes that the initiatives and the formation 
of the community structure, its rules and its 
policies were not done by local people, but by 
the government. She argues that the country is 
so tightly bound to its patron-client culture and 
all-pervasive notion of hierarchy, that the top-
down nature in which the community approach 
has been implemented might be well-suited to 
the present context, where participation rarely 
exists beyond the nuclear family—as its people 
have not been empowered to exercise their 
rights and duties in a democratic system—and 
networking beyond the family and village is 
rare. Deference to political and administrative 
power is embedded in Cambodian society 
(CDRI 2008). Donor agencies advise that FWUC 
leaders should not already be established 
community leaders. There are merits in using 
established leaders (greater transparency and 
a system of checks and balances), but it may 
cause these new institutions to struggle to 
navigate existing loyalties to power structures 
(Chea et al. 2011). They cite the newly 
established FWUC in DAP in Pursat Province 
which has seven commune council members, 
one from each of the communes within the 
command area. The Pursat PDoWRAM justified 
this on the grounds that the CC representatives 
were well-known and popular, and had been 
good leaders and managers in the past. They 
owned rice fields in the command area and 
were well-off. 
While the PIMD policy assumes that 
implementation would be democratic (i.e. 
the association’s leaders would be decided 
on in an election), this was rarely realized. 
In fact, Molle (2005) asserts that these facts 
were not considered in adjusting policies and 
interventions to the Cambodian context. While 
participation in irrigation management implies 
that farmers should be involved in the process 
of designing policy, it is common for farmers 
and other stakeholders to work in hierarchical 
ways and rely on higher levels of government 
for direction (Nang et al. 2011). Observers 
(Perera 2006; Thuon et al. 2007; CDRI 2008; 
Chea et al. 2011), state that establishing FWUCs 
as local bodies governing irrigation marks a 
fundamental change in the way farmers go 
about their business, which needs to be borne 
in mind when making policy prescriptions. 
Compounding this, is the impact of several 
decades of civil wars and trauma on people’s 
psyche, the fact that the country’s adoption of 
democracy and decentralization is still recent 
and incomplete, and the governance structure 
is overridden by patrimonial political practices 
(Chea 2010). In particular, Chea et al. (2011) 
emphasize the bitter experience with the  
so-called participatory approach of the 
collective farming experiment of the Khmer 
Rouge, which remains at large in the memories 
of several generations of Cambodians. 
CDRI (2008) see the lack of cooperation 
among farmers as a reaction against the 
authoritarianism of the last three decades, and 
a widespread breakdown in trust. Perera (2006) 
emphasizes the need for extensive farmer 
mobilization to change the existing behavior 
of farmers into group action to fit in with 
the technical interventions of new irrigation 
designs.
According to Perera (2006), another factor 
affecting farmer participation is the renting 
of paddy lands by their owners. He cites the 
5 February Irrigation Scheme where farmers 
who are involved in highland cultivation have 
rented out their land in the irrigation scheme. 
Although the FWUC constitution allows both 
landowners and tenants to be members, the 
tenants with an insecure claim to the land they 
cultivate are usually less willing to be involved 
in the FWUC and associated irrigation system 
management. 
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The issues discussed above contrast strongly 
with the theoretical and top-down approach 
adopted by the government and donors in 
developing the PIMD and D&D policies as part 
of an overall donor-funding package, with no 
involvement of local people (Nang et al. 2011). 
This constitutes the gap between a neat generic 
theory of PIMD and its implementation in the 
unique Cambodian rural context. Molle (2005) 
sees the motives for PIMD in Cambodia as 
another example of such policies serving state 
objectives (avoiding recurrent state expenditure 
and increasing rice production at national level) 
rather than a true commitment to addressing 
rural poverty. This is supported by Perera (2006), 
who found that FWUCs were left to work alone, 
with minimal or no support from local people 
or from the state.
Uncertainty and conflict over institutional roles 
Chea (2010) points out that, uniquely, 
CBNRM and decentralized NRM have been 
running simultaneously in Cambodia’s 
irrigation policy. While MoWRAM’s national 
water policy delegates the management 
responsibilities of a specific irrigation system 
to the FWUC, represented by a locally elected 
committee, the nationwide decentralization 
policy (inaugurated in 2002) gives the newly 
autonomous elected local body, the commune 
council, the right to manage natural resources, 
including water, within the commune’s 
territory. While it is generally recognized that 
councils will play a critical role in resource 
management, their powers and functions 
in relation to irrigation water management 
are broad and vague. Article 41 of the Law 
on the Administration and Management 
of Commune/Sangkat (2001) deems that 
commune councils “shall have roles to uphold 
and support good governance by using all 
available resources to address the basic needs 
of its commune/Sangkat to serve the common 
interests of citizens and respect the national in 
accordance with general policy of the State.” 
The same law (Article 43) states that this should 
include promotion of social and economic 
development, upgrading of the living standards 
of the citizens, and protecting and preserving 
the environment and natural resources.9 
However, this falls short of specifying the 
kind of support that commune councils can 
provide to ensure that the creation of a FWUC 
responds to local community’s needs, rather 
than simply being the wish of a line ministry 
(Chea 2010). The CDRI notes that the absence 
of a proper legal framework at the catchment 
level creates a barrier to effective stakeholder 
coordination (Tong et al. 2011). Three important 
sub-decrees, namely, those on FWUCs, river 
basin management, and water allocation and 
licensing remain in draft, making it difficult 
for agencies to implement their assigned 
duties within their areas of jurisdiction. The 
relationship between commune councils and 
FWUCs, and its mechanisms remains unclear. 
Despite appearing to enjoy an overlapping 
mandate over irrigation water with FWUCs, 
Chea (2010) finds that the vagueness of this 
mandate has prevented the councils from being 
fully involved in irrigation water governance, 
with very limited authority over either the 
farmers or the FWUC. In fact, Rusten et al. (2004) 
found that the councils are often at odds with 
the line department and the FWUC over water 
management decisions, due the operation 
of different allegiances between FWUCs 
and commune councils. In the former case, 
accountability is to the (farmer) community, 
while in the case of commune councils it is to a 
political party. 
Another factor that appears to link FWUCs 
and commune councils is the annual 
development planning process adopted 
under the D&D programme, where village 
development priorities are merged into 
commune development priorities that are in 
turn combined into a District Priority Activity 
Matrix presented to the government, donors 
and NGOs to elicit their support at a district 
integration workshop. While such a process 
seems capable of attracting investments, 
discussions held with CC and FWUC members 
in Boeng Sne irrigation scheme (Prey Veng 
Province) (IWMI 2012) suggest that the process 
of identifying district-level priorities is ad 
hoc from a village or FWUC (i.e. bottom-up) 
perspective, given the uncertainty surrounding 
the selection of any single priority identified at 
village or commune levels. While this planning 
process is meant to facilitate bottom-up 
planning to reflect local needs, village-specific 
and even commune-specific priorities are not 
easily highlighted in the district workshop, 
since the selection of priorities first at commune 
level and then district level is based on their 
recurrence amongst the villages (at commune 
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level) and communes (at district level). The 
more villages that share a common priority, the 
more likely that it will be chosen as a commune 
priority, and the more communes that share 
the same or similar priority, the greater the 
chance of it being included as a priority for the 
district. It is, therefore, possible for a priority 
for one or a few villages or communes, to be 
lost at district level. For example, although the 
need for a high capacity pumping station is 
a common need amongst most communes 
in the Boeng Sne irrigation scheme, it may 
be overwhelmed by priorities of other 
communes and may be dropped as a district 
priority. Moreover, according to the commune 
council members interviewed, the process of 
setting commune priorities does not include 
farmers, as only village heads, CC members 
and government staff participate. None of 
the village heads and commune council 
members interviewed had attended a district 
integration workshop. The question then is 
how effective this development planning 
process is in meeting funding needs of specific 
FWUCs operating within a commune or across 
two or more communes. There seems to be 
significant uncertainty about the likelihood of 
being represented in the final list of priorities, 
and it is unclear as to how much of state and 
donor funds are channelled through this 
planning process, as opposed to being directly 
channelled through line ministries.
Nang et al. (2011) found that, at the national 
scale, the complex institutional set up also 
inhibits participatory decision-making that 
affects meaningful PIMD implementation. For 
instance, NCDD has members from many line 
ministries, except MoWRAM. NCDD tries to 
promote empowerment of local authorities and 
communities (encouraging more bottom-up 
decision-making), while MoWRAM creates the 
FWUCs in a top-down manner at the local level, 
following the PIMD policy, since they must be 
initiated and registered by MoWRAM. 
Lack of planning and coordination at broader 
spatial/hydrological scales  
The CDRI finds that increased competition 
over irrigation water between upstream and 
downstream communities during the dry 
season to be one of the most critical issues 
afflicting FWUC performance (Chem and 
Someth 2011). The CDRI observes a lack of 
coordination in the provision of water for 
multiple uses, including ecosystems (Chem 
et al. 2011). This is accompanied by a lack of 
hydrological information and knowledge that 
impedes water allocation, especially when 
dealing with multiple irrigation schemes. A 
greater understanding of spatial and temporal 
water flow is likely to improve catchment 
planning (Chem and Someth 2011). This is 
despite Article 8 of the Law on Water Resources 
Management of 2007 (the Water Law) requiring 
MoWRAM to maintain a centralized inventory of 
the water resources each year. Interviews with 
PDoWRAM staff in Battambang and Prey Veng 
provinces by IWMI (de Silva and Senaratna-
Sellamuttu 2012) confirmed that decisions to 
rehabilitate existing irrigation systems are taken 
in isolation from systemic hydrological realities. 
Vuthy and Ra (2010) emphasize the almost total 
absence of groundwater data, and hence the 
inability to mitigate the impacts of droughts 
and other climate factors without degrading 
the resource base.
The need for a better planning structure is 
recognized by SAW, which calls for multi-
stakeholder river basin plans, with the 
participation of the ministries of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), Rural 
Development (MRD), and Environment (MoE). 
The operation of jurisdictions of three separate 
ministries (MoWRAM, MoE and MAFF) in 
the management of water resources makes 
coordination imperative. Such coordination 
is, in fact, weak (CDRI 2008), since the vertical 
accountability of ministries and their line 
departments is so strong that it usually 
overrides the horizontal accountability of line 
departments at the provincial level.
The impact of insufficient hydrological data 
and institutional coordination on the ground 
is demonstrated by CDRI (Chem et al. 2011) 
in the Stung Chrey Bak catchment, where a 
contributing factor to water shortages was the 
lack of good coordination between upstream 
and downstream FWUCs in their water allocation 
decision-making. Nang et al. (2011) reported 
that farmers in this catchment thought that 
only PDoWRAM (or the LAs) had the right 
over the rivers in the catchment, whereas all 
three stakeholders have the responsibility for 
management of the rivers in the catchment. The 
coordination challenge is further complicated 
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when the same water source supplying multiple 
irrigation schemes flows across more than 
one province. This introduces inter-provincial 
dynamics, when farmers downstream in one 
province need water released from the upstream 
users in another province. The FWUCs plan 
cropping individually without consulting each 
other, contributing to dry-season shortages 
of water (Chem and Someth 2011). No formal 
institutional arrangements at catchment scale 
are in place for dealing with these complexities 
(Chea et al. 2011), and under the current 
arrangements, upstream irrigators have prior 
access to water, leaving downstream users at a 
significant disadvantage (Chem et al. 2011).
The Law on Water Resources Management 
(2007) remains largely confined to paper, 
especially with respect to the creation of basin/
sub-basin level planning processes. This law 
empowers MoWRAM to declare any basin,  
sub-basin or aquifer as a Water Law 
Implementation Area, when there are likely 
to be conflicts among water users, the water 
may become polluted or the area may suffer 
watershed degradation (Article 5). It goes on to 
explicitly require the government to encourage 
collaboration with, and participation of, the 
relevant agencies, and private sector, beneficiary 
groups, NGOs, and international organizations 
in all activities related to the management, 
investment, exploitation, conservation and 
development of water resources (Article 7).
production constraints
Cambodian farmers do not grow good quality 
produce, and affordable access to quality 
and reliable inputs is a major impediment to 
improving agricultural productivity and the 
quality of produce (RGC 2010a). The study 
found that there is inadequate importation of 
quality farm inputs, such as seed, fertilizer and 
pesticides, that comply with the Law on the 
Management of Quality and Safety of Products 
and Services (2000). In 2008, an increase in farm 
input prices have pushed up production costs 
by 30% for dry-season rice, 70% for  
wet-season rice, and 45% for maize, cassava, 
and soybean production (ADB 2012a). 
Moreover, Chea et al. (2011) found that even 
with the high yields that dry-season crops can 
produce, the fluctuating market price of rice 
relative to its production costs discourages 
farmers from growing a dry-season crop. 
Fundamental constraints for smallholders 
imposed by uncertainty of tenure, farm size 
and trends in land markets
When considering agriculture from a poverty 
and food security perspective, in particular, 
land is a fundamental driver, in terms of: 
determining production performance and 
inequity. An analysis carried out by CDRI 
(Kimsun et al. 2011) indicates that many 
rural households in Cambodia suffer from 
landlessness or near landlessness, or lack of 
formal property rights to land, and see this 
as a major driver of widespread rural poverty 
and a limitation to agricultural productivity 
growth. Although there are no figures on how 
much of agricultural land is currently titled, 
an estimated 20% of rural Cambodians are 
thought to be landless and another 20-25% 
have less than 0.5 ha (the estimated threshold 
for food self-sufficiency). This suggests that 
(subject to renting arrangements) almost 
half (around 45%) of rural households cannot 
produce adequate food to meet their dietary 
requirements, let alone produce a surplus to 
sell (Diepart 2010) found this figure to be 65% 
in Trapeang Russei, Kampong Thom Province). 
In fact, while large farmers with 1 ha of land 
or more were able to increase their yields, 
small farmers with less than 1 ha and limited 
savings to meet rising costs of production, 
had declining or stagnant wet- and dry-season 
rice yields (CDRI 2012). Rising prices of farm 
inputs meant that land productivity of small 
landholders with less than 1 ha declined. 
Farmers claimed that the prices of farm inputs 
were double those of two or three years earlier. 
This constraint, combined with ineffective 
agricultural extension services, has limited the 
ability of small farmers to intensify and diversify 
their agricultural production. 
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This large landless/smallholder scenario 
is rooted in the evolution of land tenure 
systems over the past decades. All land was 
collectivized during the Khmer Rouge regime 
until its demise in 1979, after which the new 
government decided to establish collective 
property rights for land, to avert a possibility 
of widespread famine (Üllenberg 2009). 
When this failed, the free-market economy 
system was adopted in 1989 and private 
property rights were reintroduced. Lands 
were distributed to households based on 
family size and availability of cultivable land 
in the villages. In the distribution of land, local 
authorities played a significant role, as they 
had certain power to decide on the size, type 
and location of land to be given as well as to 
choose the recipients, based on the size of the 
family (Üllenberg 2009). While, on average, 
1.37 ha were given to those families who 
applied, the size of the family determined 
the amount of land allocated. Consequently, 
single households got small land areas, which 
became insufficient as the family grew. While 
this approach may have seemed equitable, in 
principle at the time, it has initiated differences 
in landholdings and resulted in inequities that 
are visible today (Diepart 2010). For instance, 
the distribution of agricultural equipment and 
draught animals followed the same patterns 
as land redistribution, so that larger families 
received more land and more equipment (i.e. 
more productive capital). This has enabled 
these households to achieve a greater degree 
of household food security, compared to the 
continued food insecurity of many smallholders. 
Other forms of land acquisition by smallholders, 
such as forest clearance and land purchase 
was virtually closed off to them. Diepart (2010) 
found that permission had to be obtained from 
local authorities to get additional forestland, 
which involved financial contributions (making 
it virtually a land purchase) and strong 
connections with commune and/or district 
authorities. This, combined with the intense 
land speculation on state land by companies 
or individuals, facilitated the granting of rights 
to own state land as private property by actors 
in the local administration (commune, district 
and province) and largely excluded the peasant 
communities. Thus, local-level state agencies 
have become key actors in state land markets, 
giving rise to a structural land access problem 
for smallholders who still largely depend on 
agriculture for their livelihoods (Diepart 2010).
Diepart (2010) concludes that such a 
manifestation of the re-emergence of 
capitalism in the agrarian system generates the 
opposite results to those who want to introduce 
land reform within a free market mechanism. 
Under such reforms, land titling would increase 
land security for households who will use land 
as collateral to borrow money to improve 
land productivity. The land market will ensure 
the reallocation of land to those who are the 
most efficient in cultivating it, supposedly the 
household with the smaller landholding. It was 
further assumed that land-scarce households 
(i.e. smallholders) would be able to acquire 
land through the market since land-abundant 
households would sell excess land. In fact, the 
very opposite has been shown to be the case, 
where land sales are more frequent amongst 
land-scarce households (Diepart 2010) and 
large farmers and other external investors 
accumulate agricultural land.
The emergence of land sales generally by 
smallholders, is likely to affect overall food 
production, smallholder food security and 
poverty reduction, and will influence the 
stated objectives of SAW and similar policies. 
Interestingly, Diepart (2010) found that, in Srayov 
and Trapeang Russei communes (Kampong 
Thom Province), 74% of land sale transactions 
are motivated by non-productive purposes (18% 
for health reasons, 46% for basic household 
expenditure and 10% to pay a debt), which can 
be seen as expressions of overall vulnerability. 
Although he finds that only 26% of land sales 
are motivated by the value of the land itself (to 
secure up-front capital to launch a non-farming 
activity), this may not be inconsistent with the 
hypothesis that this is a growing trend. Some 
support for this also emerged in Kamping Pouy 
irrigation scheme (Battambang Province), where 
some small farmers who viewed their plots as 
being unprofitable decided to sell them and join 
migration groups to other schemes or sought 
work across the border in Thailand and Vietnam 
(de Silva and Senaratna-Sellamuttu 2012). 
Underpinning this, was the rise in the  
per-hectare price, from US$ 10,000 to US$ 
50,000, as larger investors sought control over 
more irrigated land. Further evidence of large 
price increases in irrigated land is provided by 
CDRI (2012), where the percentage change in 
price between 2004/2005 and 2008 (Table 4) 
is well over 100% in all but two of the study 
villages, with some values exceeding 1,000%. 
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This rapid rise in land sales as a significant 
contributor to income is clear from Figure 7, 
which shows the consistently rising percentage 
of per capita income from land sales between 
2001 and 2008. By 2008, land sales appear to 
contribute as much as agriculture to per capita 
income. This has caused the number of landless 
households to accelerate between 2005 and 
2008, and according to Üllenberg (2009), the 
Gini coefficient indicates an inequality of land 
distribution in rural areas of 0.66. It appears 
that the land market and resulting changes 
in landholdings are working contrary to the 
support small farmers need in government 
policy. 
According to Diepart (2010), the only viable 
option for marginalized smallholders is the 
land rental markets which, contrary to the 
land purchase market, are less biased towards 
wealth and seem to offer a much more 
promising perspective for equal access to 
land (Figure 8). He finds that households with 
smaller landholdings relative to active labor 
tend to acquire land through land rental, and 
this is assisted by the practice of sharecropping 
in preference to cash rent.
Table 4: Change in average real price of land per hectare by village, 2001-2008
KHR 10, 000/ha % change
2001 2004/5 2008 2001–4/5 2004/5–8
Krasang 227 360 1058 58 194
Andong Trach 203 96 403 -56 320
Trapeang Prei 84 234 4,588 178 1862
Khsach Chi Ros 41 58 142 43 143
Dang kdar 70 63 156 -11 149
Kompong Tnoat 328 688 3,855 110 460
Prek Khmeng 136 244 5,060 79 1976
Kanchor 191 272 205 42 -25
Ba Baong 194 240 375 24 57
All villages 167 263 1479 24 462
Source: CDR 2012.
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The issue of land ownership has been further 
intensified by a rapid surge in population10 
growth  in a context of limited agricultural land 
(about 2.8 million ha), of which 91% is devoted 
to rice cultivation and the remainder to other 
food and industrial crops (primarily rubber) 
(ADB 2010). Technically 80% of Cambodia’s 
land area remains state-owned. In addition, 
a review of agricultural production by UNDP 
and the Ministry of Environment (2011) finds 
that gaining secure land tenure is the most 
important factor in improving agricultural yields. 
Moreover, Mund (2011) reports that, despite 
the emphasis placed by SAW on releasing more 
land for SLCs, and the intention to review the 
ELC system, the national agricultural land policy 
tends to promote the granting of large-scale 
economic concessions, rather than relying on 
sustainable innovations and improvements in 
smallholder farming systems.
From an overall rice production perspective, 
the tendency for the land market to create 
fewer larger farm plots may hold potential, 
since Diepart (2010), for instance, finds that it 
is the larger landowners who use their land as 
collateral to invest in productive technologies. 
This is also driven by a lower labor-to-land 
ratio compared to smallholders, who have 
more labor than an ability to borrow money for 
technology upgrades. However, this type of land 
accumulation of existing and utilized irrigated 
lands must be distinguished from the large 
tracts of state land that remain underutilized in 
the form of ELCs (Diepart 2010).
Poor quality seeds
Sothath and Sophal (2010) believe that 
proper seed selection will help farmers to 
increase their rice yields by 18%, but notes 
that improved seed, fertilizers and tractors are 
still limited in supply in Cambodia. They cite 
statistics from the Super Seed Company of the 
Agriculture Quality Improvement Project (AQIP), 
a registered seed distribution company in 
Cambodia, which claims that sales of its seeds 
represent only 3–5% of the market share, with 
10–20% of the market share being taken up 
by seeds from Vietnamese producers, and the 
balance being supplied by a few small domestic 
distributors and household seed banks from the 
previous harvest. This suggests, therefore, that 
there is significant potential for productivity 
improvements if investments were directed 
towards the importation of good quality seeds 
of the correct varieties, and enhancement of 
in-country seed production and markets that 
make these seeds accessible at affordable 
prices.
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Figure 8: Frequency of land leases (rent-in and rent-out)
Source: Diepart 2010
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IWMI’s dialogues with farmers in the Kamping 
Pouy and Boeng Sne irrigation schemes (de Silva 
and Senaratna-Sellamuttu 2012) suggest that the 
challenge is more complex than the procurement 
of good quality seeds. While there is no doubt 
that seed quality is important, the varieties used 
by farmers in both schemes was driven by the 
availability of a ready market (Vietnamese) and 
their ability to complete cropping cycles in the 
face of increasingly unreliable rainfall patterns. 
Seed varieties from Vietnam with short harvesting 
periods were thus preferred over the majority of 
varieties promoted by MAFF. This was also due 
to the knowledge of a ready market for a specific 
seed variety, which leant a higher degree of 
certainty to farmers’ earnings. Therefore, while 
quality is necessary, irrespective of the variety, 
ensuring the adoption of rice varieties according 
to a specific government agenda is likely to be 
more challenging.
Fertilizer - lack of availability and poor quality 
Chemical fertilizer use is extremely low despite 
native soils often being very infertile (ADB 
2012a). The average amount of fertilizer used in 
Cambodia is below the national recommended 
rate, and is considered to be the lowest rate of 
fertilizer use for rice cultivation in Southeast 
Asia, with around 30% of the total area receiving 
minimal applications. On average, farmers 
applied 221 kg of fertilizer in Vietnam and 108 
kg in Thailand, which both share similar soil and 
temperature conditions with Cambodia (ADB 
2012a). Current fertilizer costs seem to be a major 
factor as shown in Figure 9, which suggests 
that this input alone accounts for about 20% of 
household expenditure, annually.11 Yu and Diao 
(2010) confirm that higher fertilizer prices have 
prevented farmers from applying a sufficient 
amount of fertilizer to their crops. In addition 
to high prices, fertilizer use is also significantly 
affected by poor quality. Fertilizers and 
agrochemicals are imported informally across the 
border from Thailand and Vietnam, and sample 
testing has shown that fertilizers can be diluted by 
up to 48% (RGC 2010a). There are also no Khmer 
instructions on the label to ensure proper usage.
Yu and Fan (2009) found that land expansion, 
fertilizer use and irrigation are major 
determinants in the paddy-supply response, but 
with substantial differences in the production 
relationships across regions. They suggest, 
through simulated results, that when fertilizer 
prices increase, high output prices (such as those 
seen in 2007 and 2008) maintain the profitability 
of rice production due to the crop’s high 
responsiveness to fertilizer application. problem
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Figure 9: Household expenditure on fertilizer and fuel
Source: NIS (2007); Mokoro (2010), Source: ADB 2012b
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Table 5: Key outputs achieved in the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
Units 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Research
New varieties developed 13(1999-2009)
Cash crop varieties no. 6(1999-2009)
Soil, water, harvest packages no. 2 4 4
Leveling, tillage demos no. 2 1 1
Extension
Farmers at training courses ‘000 15.4 17.1 17.4 56.4 11.0 21.3 20.7
Farmers at workshops/meetings ‘000 2.5 1.5 6.0 24.1 6.5 8.1 4.4
Farmers at field visits ‘000 0.1 0.6 1.5 1.3 1.8 0.0 0.4
Farmers at field school ‘000 2.4 2.9 3.1 5.3 4.3 0.4
Farmers at demonstrations ‘000 1.1 1.0 1.1 0.9 4.7 0.5 0.6
Farmers at demonstration days ‘000 2.4 4.7 3.0 8.4 0.8 3.2 2.2
Total farmers contacted ‘000 23.9 27.8 32.1 96.4 24.7 37.5 28.7 20
 as % of all farmers 0.9 1.1 1.2 3.6 0.9 1.4 1.0
Irrigation
New areas irrigated (DoP) ‘000 ha 24.20 51.1 28 43.8 89.2 52.1 54.1 25
 as % of all total irrigated area 3.8% 7.5% 4.1% 5.9% 10.6% 5.9% 5.8% 2.7%
Rural Roads
Rehabilitation km 107 349 256 277 204 262 585 43
 as % of all total rural roads 0.4% 1.2% 90.0% 90.0% 70.0% 80.0% 1.8% 1.3%
 No. of rehabilitated roads no. 11 17 11 8 13 23 34 3
Periodic maintenance km 297 999 609 0 353 510 50
 as % of all total rural roads 0 1.0% 3.4% 2.0% 0 1.1% 1.6% 1.6%
Routine maintenance km 82 159 124 241 334 384 535 59
 as % of all total rural roads 0.3% 0.6% 0.4% 0.8% 1.1% 1.2% 1.7% 1.8%
DoP = Department of Planning, ha = hectare, km = kilometer.
Note: Blank spaces indicate data not available.
Sources: Cambodian Agricultural Research and Development Institute 10-year achievement report (1999–2009) 
and Annual Report (2003–2005), Department of Agriculture Extension Annual Reports, MOWRAM DoP records, 
and Cambodian Information System on Irrigation Systems, MRD Department of Rural Roadsrecords. Figures aim 
to include government- and donor-funded activities, but not communes, nongovernment organizations, political 
parties, or private sector. Cited in Mokoro (2010).  
Source: ADB, 2012b
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Insufficient extension services
Agricultural extension services have limited 
coverage and do not serve the needs of 
subsistence and commercially oriented farmers. 
Diepart (2010) found that in both Srayov and 
Trapeang Russei communes, the state had 
completely withdrawn its support to farmers 
after the dismantling of the Krom Samaki system 
(Srayov commune). This seems to be the case 
nationwide (Table 5) where extension services 
provided by MAFF each year from 2002 to 2009 
was limited to little more than 1% of farmers in 
the country. At the same time, there are no private 
sector technical or business development services 
available to commercial farmers (RGC 2010a). 
This lack of extension services may represent 
an unrealized gain in productivity of as much as 
30% (and 40% in villages with irrigation systems), 
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according to Sothath and Sophal (2010). A further 
cost of poor extension services, as recognized 
by the government (RGC 2010a), is that primary 
producers are limited in their ability to diversify 
because they are unable to break into new crops 
or products because of donor and government 
programs, which only present information on 
how to produce more of the traditional crops. 
This is confirmed by CDRI (2012), which found 
that while some farmers had picked up new ideas 
on diversification from traders and neighbors, 
they have been less successful, owing to a lack of 
know-how and unreliable extension services. 
Capacity amongst both MAFF and MoWRAM 
is a major constraint, with Lim (2006) noting 
that there are only 500 extension officers 
nationwide. SAW (RGC 2010a) recognizes that 
the capacities of the project management 
office (PMO) and project implementation unit 
(PIU) under PDoWRAMs are constrained by 
inadequate personnel. It also acknowledges 
that the remuneration of civil servants does 
not encourage self-development of staff or 
attract qualified and experienced personnel. 
Consequently, PDAs and PDoWRAMS do not 
have the capacity to deliver technical services 
required under the law to provincial councils. 
Sothath and Sophal (2010) demonstrate 
structural constraints related to how technical 
staff are deployed within these agencies. They 
find that at the sub-national level, agricultural 
personnel are concentrated at the provincial 
level. In Takeo and Kandal provinces, they 
found nearly 70% of agricultural personnel 
were stationed at the provincial Department 
of Agriculture, with only 30% working in the 
districts and municipalities—and each of these 
extension workers were expected to provide 
support to as many as 5,000 farm households, 
on average. District Offices of Agriculture do 
not receive a budget from the government for 
executing activities, and are almost entirely 
reliant on assistance from donor projects and 
NGOs. Consequently, except for salaries, office 
supplies and support to purchase about 10 to 
15 liters of gasoline per month, they do not have 
set budgets for field activities.12 Furthermore, 
the authors conclude that extension services 
seem to be duplicated in the same districts and 
even at the village level. The lack of labor and 
other operational resources is magnified by 
the remoteness of many regions of the country 
making travel to remore communities time-
consuming and expensive (CDRI 2010). Thus, 
assuming that PDAFF is operating with limited 
resources, they would tend to focus efforts on 
closer, easier-to-reach areas.
Two further related issues highlighted by Sothath 
and Sophal (2010) is the quality of the services 
that reach farmers, and farmers’ capacity to 
assimilate this new information effectively into 
their farming. Dialogues held with farmers 
confirm that, despite attending extension courses, 
farmers have gained little understanding from 
these courses. Many of the farmers complained 
that the training was difficult to understand 
and suggested that trainers should provide 
clearer explanations, with experiments during 
the training and field demonstrations after 
the training. The farmers suggested that the 
courses should be provided to them every year, 
just before the start of the cropping season, so 
they could easily remember how to apply the 
information gained during training on their 
farms. This highlights the limited capacity of 
farmers, and the need for more extension agents 
at the village level. However, the fact that the 
extension services lacked experiments or field 
demonstrations suggests poor service delivery as 
well. The authors also find that adoption rates for 
new agricultural methods and techniques varied 
a lot from one village to another. On average, the 
adoption rate was about 6% , which is moderately 
higher than would be expected, although most 
were found to adopt only part of the extension 
advice and much of this service delivery was due 
to assistance from donors and NGOs.
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Costly credit and the resulting poverty trap
In terms of rural finance, there is very little 
long-term financing for investment capital 
available (RGC 2010a). The majority of loans 
from the formal sector require collateral, and 
in the informal sector, moneylenders charge 
high rates of interest that do not solve cash-
flow problems in the long-term. Figure 10 
shows that high interest rates and a lack 
of collateral account for almost half of the 
situations where credit was not availed of in 
the study conducted by Lim (2006). Given that 
the majority of financing is informal, Perera 
(2006) uses the Boeng Sne irrigation scheme 
to illustrate the poverty trap that most farmers 
are in. Due to the informal credit arrangements 
with the dealers, farmers are compelled to buy 
low-quality inputs at higher prices and input 
less than what is needed due to high prices. 
According to the credit arrangements, they are 
compelled to sell the produce to these dealers 
at a low price. Through this example, Perera 
(2006) also illustrates the corrosive influence 
of such credit arrangements on other critical 
farm inputs as well as the farmers’ ability to 
obtain a fair, if not good, price. Üllenberg (2009) 
demonstrates that it is not only borrowings 
directly related to farming that impacts on a 
household’s agricultural activities, by observing 
that while the poor are forced to borrow from 
private lenders at extremely high interest rates 
for a variety of reasons (e.g. to recover from 
floods and droughts, illness, etc. and some 
unrelated to agriculture), it is their agricultural 
land that may be sold to repay these debts 
as it is the only valuable asset they have. ADB 
(2008b) estimated that the unmet demand 
for rural credit was between US$ 50 million 
and US$ 100 million. Another report by ADB 
(2012b) points out that since farmers are forced 
to sell their produce as soon as possible post-
harvest to avoid cumulative interest charges on 
borrowings, large volumes of paddy rice reach 
the market at the same time, bringing prices 
down, thereby further depressing the real value 
of their produce. Another CDRI report (Tong 
et al. 2011) found that households practicing 
double-cropping were strongly associated with 
higher borrowing, suggesting that high interest 
rates may also constrain intensification. 
Although Phallika (2012) concludes that this 
situation has changed little in 2012, a different 
picture of the current credit situation is 
provided by CDRI. CDRI (2012) claims that since 
2005, services from microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) have been increasingly available to 
farmers, as the proportion of panel households 
able to access credit from MFIs show an 
increasing trend, up to 57% of households in 
2008, from 35% in 2004/2005 and only 19% 
in 2001, with the percentage borrowed for 
agriculture increasing from 18% in 2004/5 
to 24% in 2008. The report states that MFIs, 
including ACLEDA Bank Plc, Amret, PRASAC, 
AMK and other NGOs, offer cheaper loan 
interest rates of 3% per month compared with 
10–40% charged by private moneylenders, and 
that the number of licensed MFIs in Cambodia 
has increased rapidly between 2005 and 2008. 
It also states that loan portfolios have risen 
sharply, from a total of US$ 149,000 serving 
only 494,000 borrowers in 2005 to US$ 438,000 
serving 1,020,000 in 2008 (CDRI 2012). However, 
the report acknowledges that the poor often 
lack the required collateral to obtain credit 
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Figure 10: Reasons for not taking formal credit
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from formal financial institutions, and that this 
limits their capacity to benefit from emerging 
economic opportunities generated by growth. 
In fact, poor households with limited capital 
for collateral find it difficult to obtain MFI loans, 
and their reliance on loans from relatives, 
friends and moneylenders remained higher 
than for the non-poor in 2008. The report 
further noted that many households, especially 
the poor, experienced a food deficit and took 
out loans for consumption purposes. In such 
cases, if their incomes did not improve, they 
then had to borrow more money from another 
MFI to repay their outstanding loans, thereby 
falling into a vicious cycle of debt and remained 
trapped in poverty. An analysis of the social and 
financial efficiencies of several MFIs by Crawford 
et al. (2011) provides a different picture. They 
too found an expansion of credit services, and 
that social and financial efficiency were not 
necessarily mutually exclusive, i.e., socially 
focussed MFIs do not necessarily sacrifice 
financial efficiency in order to maximize their 
outreach by serving additional poor people. 
However, their results show that this has only 
occurred in a few cases, and in others, the 
data show an increase in financial efficiency 
and a general decline in social efficiency since 
2003. While they don’t disregard more efficient 
functioning as one explanation for this, they 
suggest that declining social efficiency could 
result from what they call ‘mission drift’, where 
MFIs shift focus from the poor to more affluent 
clients. Data specific to the agriculture sector is 
provided by ADB (2012b), which shows that, as 
of 31 December 2009, only 12.95% of all bank 
credit was for agricultural loans (Table 6). The 
microfinance sector of the financial system is 
robust, having benefited from considerable 
donor investment and technical support. 
However, they have limited funds to lend, as 
they are mostly reliant on donor and social 
investment fund lines of credit and, hence, are 
already fully loaned up with the lowest risk 
loans. In his investigations in Kampong Thom 
Province, Diepart (2010) further enriches this 
picture in several ways. His finding that 63% of 
borrowings were from formal sources (banks 
or NGOs) supports the view that formal credit 
is more available today than half a decade ago. 
However, he notes that access to formal credit 
is spatially differentiated, depending on the 
proximity of households (and villages) to main 
transport routes. Consequently, informal credit 
sources with higher interest rates continue to 
be dominant in more remote areas.
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Table 6: Lending by sector (2003–2009)
Sector December 2003 December 2004 December 2005 December 2006 December 2007 December 2008 December 2009
% % % % % % %
Agriculture 43,947 3.09 64,774 3.39 69,287 3.02 148,717 4.28 305,245 4.88 516,297 9.62 708,874  12.95
Manufacturing 187,563 13.2 269,187  14.08 11.29 258,756  410,579 11.82 625,585 9.99 983,664  18.32 920,411  16.82
Construction 83,154 5.85 97,972 5.12 144,957 6.32 269,067 7.75 640,685 10.24 773,808 14.41 904,485 16.52
Wholesale and 
retail
225,564 15.88 363,049 18.99 532,450 23.23 783,479 22.56 1,371,077 21.9 1,617,970 30.13 1,352,907 24.72
Export 117,471 8.27 77,615 4.06 37,507 1.64 26,209 0.75 13,728 0.22 … … … …
Import 81,356 5.73 110,973 5.80 168,046 7.33 142,642 4.11 229,663 3.67 … … … …
Finance 102,148 7.19 100,068 5.23 26,485 1.16 24,004 0.69 36,495 0.58 658,710 12.27 878,576 16.05
Real estate and 
public utilities
66,392 4.67 50,329 2.63 147,555 6.44 298,886 8.61 495,447 7.91 737,442 13.37 662,826 12.95
Services 478,440 33.68 675,634 35.33 667,473 29.12 1,146,160 33.01 1,802,350 28.79 … … … …
Others 34,569 2.43 102,568 5.36 239,925 10.47 222,388 6.40 739,422 11.81 81,313 1.51 45,622 0.83
Total 1,420,604 100.00 1,912,169 100.00 2,292,442 100.00 3,472,130 100.00 6,259,697 100.00 5,369,204 100.00 5,473,701 100.00
… = data not available. 
Source:  NBC (2010).
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High exposure to risk and lack of crop 
insurance
Farmers’ exposure to various agricultural risks is a 
concern in disaster-prone areas (Figure 11), and 
for farmers growing, or wanting to diversify into, 
crops with high sensitivity to weather variations. 
According to the World Food Programme (WFP) 
website,13 damage to, or failure of, the rice crop is 
around 40% and the cost of such shocks or crises 
averaged 30% of total household annual cash 
income. RGC (2010a) recognizes the absence of 
any insurance against losses due to inclement 
weather or pests.
High energy costs which contribute to 
production costs
According to ADB (2012b), Cambodia imports 
all of its oil and only 25% of its population is 
connected to the electricity grid. Consequently, 
Cambodian farmers are largely dependent on 
diesel generators for household-operated water 
pumps and/or irrigation, and the rising cost 
of fuel has pushed up the costs of local and 
industrial transport and agricultural inputs such 
as fertilizer, which has increased in cost by three 
times in the past year (2011). 
Lack of incentives to upgrade production
With little likelihood of seeing higher profit 
margins, there is little incentive for farmers 
to invest in better inputs, machinery or 
infrastructure. Income in the rural areas remains 
depressed in the face of poor output prices and 
rising production costs. While daily labor wages 
have nearly doubled in the last few years, they 
have only barely kept up with the increases in 
food and energy costs. Increases in agricultural 
input costs have not been matched with higher 
prices from sale of farmers’ produce (RGC 2010a).
lack of post-harvest services constrain 
realization of the potential value of 
produce 
RGC (2010a) recognizes that farmers are 
not rewarded for their produce. While this is 
partly a result of poor quality inputs, it is also 
because, at present, farmers carry out very 
little post-harvest handling on their farms 
and are unfamiliar with modern retailing 
requirements. According to SAW, farmers are 
detached from their markets and unaware 
of consumer preferences due to the number 
of intermediaries, and support is required to 
develop and strengthen vertical value chain 
partnerships such as contract farming, between 
farmers and medium to large buyers. Thus, 
SAW foresees the establishment of commodity 
groups, through which commodity specific 
assistance can be channelled. 
Lack of post-harvest technologies and facilities
According to ADB (2012b), post-harvest and 
milling losses in the Cambodian rice industry 
are high and variable. Most rural farmers are 
forced to sell their excess grains immediately 
after harvesting, as they lack the facilities and 
expertise for timely and efficient threshing, 
handling, drying, storage and processing of 
crops (this is in addition to the need to ease 
their debt burdens). Local estimates of grain 
losses, from harvest to storage, range from 
20% to 50% , and are as high as 30% during 
milling. Farmers must sell whatever extra rice 
they produce immediately after harvesting 
because of poor and limited storage facilities. 
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Figure 11: Areas under rice cultivation that are affected and destroyed as a result of natural disasters
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Fforestry and Fisheries
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At such time, given the oversupply of rice in the 
market, farmers have little bargaining power 
to negotiate the selling price. In addition, the 
quality of the rice has decreased, representing 
an added cost to farmers. However, as Phallika 
(2012) points out, addressing these weaknesses 
alone is unlikely to reduce the post-harvest 
market surplus of rice, given farmers’ need 
to clear debts accumulated to facilitate 
production. These two issues, therefore, need to 
be addressed if the pressure on farmers to sell 
early is to be eased.
Markets and prices
With a population of just under 13.8 million, 
domestic food consumption requirements are 
around 1.97 million tons of rice, leaving about 
3.5 million tons to export in paddy equivalent. 
These increasing domestic surpluses have led to 
robust growth of rice exports. Formal rice exports 
have been the fastest growing trade segment, 
expanding in value from US$ 7 million in 1998 
to US$ 332 million in 2006 (World Bank 2010). 
However, a lack of processors and millers means 
that the vast majority of agricultural produce 
is exported in unprocessed form informally to 
Vietnam and Thailand through middlemen, 
and this prevents the country from capturing 
market opportunities for value-addition 
through rice milling. For example, it has been 
estimated that about 2 million tons of paddy 
were moved informally to Vietnam and Thailand 
in 2009, where it was milled and exported to 
international markets, including Cambodia (World 
Bank 2010). Rice millers have limited access to 
affordable credit and foreign markets, owing to 
their inability to produce consistent amounts of 
standardized varieties of milled rice and their lack 
of information about foreign market conditions 
(Sothath and Sophal 2010). According to a recent 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) survey, 
about 90% of agribusiness SMEs in Cambodia 
have identified the lack of access to finance as 
being their major constraint for growth (World 
Bank 2010). These sales to middlemen occur at a 
value lower than the market price, given farmers’ 
dependence on this market. Thus, in Kampong 
Chhnang Province, a kilogram of rice was bought 
by middlemen for KHR 800 when the market price 
was KHR 1,200 per kg (Chea 2010). This represents 
a 33% loss of revenue per kg to farmers, though 
the reality is that this is preferable than being 
unable to sell all their produce in the local 
market, which cannot absorb such quantities. The 
report notes the need for a company or formal 
association in the community which can purchase 
their rice. In 2010, Cambodia‘s local middlemen 
could buy only 0.5 mt, while 3.8 mt of rice were 
exported to Thailand and Vietnam for further 
processing and packaging. According to some 
experts, Cambodia would need US$ 800 million 
to buy all paddy rice surpluses from local farmers 
(ADB 2012a). It is also suggested that the current 
uncertainty about the availability of markets 
may be causing farmers to wilfully maintain 
production at a relatively low level, pointing to a 
nationwide conscious underproduction due to 
market uncertainties.  
As the government has duly noted, a real 
opportunity for value addition, at least from an 
export revenue perspective, lies in accessing 
export markets for milled rice. This has become 
especially attractive for the government, since 
rice production has reached a sustainable 
level of surplus within the last 5 years and has 
put increasing pressure on domestic markets. 
However, despite the government’s efforts to 
encourage rice exports, the legal exports of 
milled rice have been minimal over the last 5 
years (Figure 12), even though Cambodia has a 
competitive advantage in rice over other regional 
and international rice producers due to relatively 
low costs of labor and land (ADB 2012b). Reasons 
for the current status include: an internationally 
uncompetitive rice processing sector and the lack 
of good infrastructure (roads, ports and electrical 
power) in the country. There are also other 
transactions costs in Cambodia, such as illegal 
fees while transporting rice from farm to port. As 
already seen, this has encouraged the unofficial 
export of unprocessed rice to Vietnam and 
Thailand, preventing Cambodia from capturing 
the value added from rice milling (ADB 2012a).
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Insufficient value addition
Milling is the key bottleneck in the rice value 
chain in Cambodia (ADB 2012b). Although 
there are some 3,000 milling plants scattered 
across the country, nearly all of them are small-
scale operations that rely on obsolete milling 
equipment, resulting in high levels of broken 
rice and other processing losses (Table 7). 
Lack of working capital and the high cost of 
credit constrain millers from upgrading their 
machinery and buying paddy rice from farmers. 
Concurrently, until recently, a handful of large-
scale mills have started processing rice to a 
high level of quality that meets international 
standards and these mills now monopolize 
operations, allowing them to capture high 
margins. Thus, ADB (2012b) sees a need for 
increased competition in milling to help reduce 
milling margins that are substantially higher 
than those in Vietnam, and to raise prices to 
help the small-scale producers, in particular. 
World Bank (2010) identifies limited access 
to finance as one of the main constraints for 
SMEs in Cambodia. It is estimated that, for 
domestic rice mills to purchase all current 
market surpluses of paddy in Cambodia (about 
3.1 million tons), domestic financing of US$ 196 
million would be needed. The working capital 
requirements to mill this amount of paddy 
would be about US$ 57 million, which means 
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Table 7: Major constraints in the rice-milling  
 sector
Constraints Nature of Constraints
Lack of 
working 
capital
Millers lack working capital to buy paddy 
at harvest time due to cash purchases of 
paddy and sales of milled rice on credit. 
As a result, rice mills are often idle for 
a period of time, limiting the amount 
of paddy that can be domestically 
milled. Limited capital also precludes 
improvements in milling technology and 
expansion in milling capacity.
Low paddy 
quality
Millers are constrained by poor paddy 
quality in the form of mixed variety 
of seeds from farmers and/or traders 
and inadequate postharvest handling 
(particularly drying). This results in high 
levels of broken rice that limits entry in 
world markets.
Low levels 
of milling 
technology
The majority of mills use old equipment 
from Vietnam and the People‘s Republic 
of China that are inadequate for 
sophisticated sorting of varieties and 
result in higher levels of broken rice than 
more modern machines.
Lack of 
market 
access
Rice millers have limited access to 
foreign markets due to the inability 
to produce consistent amounts of 
standardized varieties of milled rice. 
Market access is also compromised 
by limited information about foreign 
market conditions and competitive 
factors
Source: ADB 2012b
Figure 12: Percentage of rice export in total production (2001–2008)
Source: Authors’ calculation from USDA Production, Supply and Distribution Online (2008).
Source: Yu and Diao 2010
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that total domestic financing requirements 
for the milling sector would be about US$ 253 
million per year. Although the Cambodian 
government is looking for foreign investors 
to boost its rice-milling sector to increase 
production of milled rice for exports (RGC 
2011), according to World Bank (2010), there 
seems to be sufficient capital available within 
the financial sector to fund investments in 
agriculture, agro-industry and SMEs, in general. 
However, lending for agriculture from domestic 
commercial banks was about US$ 130 million 
in 2008, which represents only about 5% of 
all lending, while lending to the agribusiness 
sector (classified as manufacturing) was about 
US$ 80–110 million (or about 3–4% of total 
lending). This amounts to only 1% of working 
capital and 1.7% of the investment capital 
financing needed by SMEs. Despite the high 
liquidity in the banking system, banks are 
reluctant to lend due to the following reasons: 
(i) low level of formalization of SMEs, which 
leads to lack of sufficient market credibility; 
(ii) institutional weaknesses, such as lack of 
proper record-keeping and accounting tools; 
(iii) absence of reliable credit information that 
increases banks’ transactions costs in dealing 
with SMEs; and (iv) weak legal and regulatory 
framework that makes recovery of bad loans 
and contract ement difficult for creditors. This 
has made it difficult for lenders to assess risks 
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versus returns properly, creating differences 
in the perceived versus real risk profiles and 
resulting in untapped lending opportunities to 
SMEs (World Bank 2010).
underspending by the water and 
agriculture bureaucracies
Sothath and Sophal (2010) demonstrate that 
farmers are left underserved by public expenditure. 
Annual expenditure by MAFF and MoWRAM was 
about 4.8% (2% for MAFF) per year during 2006–
2009, although both ministries were allocated a 
cumulative 7.5% (4% for MAFF) of the total budget 
per year over the same period. This means that the 
agriculture sector seriously suffered from a lack of 
expenditure to both ministries. ADB (2012b) further 
states that there is considerable expenditure 
volatility in terms of underspending (Figure 13).
Sothath and Sophal (2010) find that although 
the nominal recurrent budget for MAFF and 
MoWRAM has been increasing since 2005, its 
share of the total recurrent budget has declined 
over the same period (Figure 14). On average, 
the recurrent budget for MAFF and MoWRAM 
was about 2.7% from 2006 to 2010, responding 
to commitments in the NSDP, falling from 
3.3% of the total recurrent budget in 2005 
to only 2.5% in 2009 and 2010. This suggests 
that agriculture has been at a disadvantage 
Figure 13: Budget execution rates by ministry, 2000–2009 (%)
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and extension), whereas other subsectors or 
programs are overfunded. Also, subsectors 
and program areas of agriculture suffer from 
fluctuating aid disbursements, explained by the 
nature of donors’ project-based support. The 
authors suggest that, while available resources 
appear to surpass the costings, underfunding 
for some subsectors is the result of poor 
coordination of, and command over, resources 
between different priorities. The allocation of 
aid to support food security, productivity and 
diversification during 2007–2009 represents 
only 25% of total agricultural aid, which is not 
even half of the commitments in the ASSDP 
(64%). Also, agricultural research and extension 
services received only 7% during the same 
period, compared to 11% committed in the 
ASSDP. While aid disbursement is not aligned 
with sector policy, the flow of disbursements by 
subsector has been unstable from year to year.
problem
 AnAlysis 
compared to other sectors in terms of the 
allocated budget, despite being recognized as 
a priority in the NSDP. Furthermore, the authors 
find that allocated resources are not necessarily 
spent as budgeted. On average, expenditure for 
MAFF and MoWRAM was less than 5% (4.8%) 
per year between 2006 and 2009, compared to 
its budget share of about 7.5% during the same 
period. This means that not all the allocated 
resources for MAFF and MoWRAM were spent. 
Sothath and Sophal (2010) discover a similar 
pattern in the disbursement of foreign aid 
(Figure 15). The total aid disbursement to 
the agriculture sector was about US$ 211 
million (or 7.7% of total aid disbursements to 
Cambodia) during 2007–2009. A closer look at 
aid disbursement for the agriculture subsectors 
and for program areas of SAW, 2006–2010, 
reveals that use of external assistance does not 
reflect the commitment of sector policies and 
strategies. Some subsectors and programs that 
are meant to benefit farmers tend to be largely 
underfunded (e.g. food security, and research 
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The preceding sections indicate the significant 
impacts that some investments in irrigation 
have had on agricultural production, while also 
making it clear that irrigation is by no means a 
panacea for emancipating a large percentage of 
a predominantly rural population from poverty. 
This view also takes a direction from findings by 
CDRI (Wokker et al. 2011), which estimate that 
the extra yield produced as a result of irrigation, 
when measured in terms of rice production, is 
very low. This was particularly the case where 
a 1% increase in water use leads to a rise in 
rice yield of only 0.06% in the wet season, 
compared to 0.12% (i.e. double the increase) 
in the dry season. The CDRI also found that, 
for amounts of water larger than 1,000 m3 per 
plot, and controlling other inputs (including 
land), very little is added to yield size. One 
interpretation of these findings may be that the 
yield increases of the past few years represent 
the difference between the availability and 
unavailability of irrigation water, and that some 
schemes are reaching the optimal point where 
further investments in irrigation may result in 
diminishing marginal returns, or larger gains 
require major investments in rehabilitating or 
upgrading infrastructure.
The most significant impact of irrigation has 
been that it enables dry-season production 
when cultivation is not generally feasible 
without irrigation. A CDRI study (Wokker et 
al. 2011) noted that 83% of farm plots that 
recorded any production in the dry season used 
irrigation. Where irrigation has worked, its value 
has not just been in terms of productivity, but 
also as a source of stability in the face of rainfall 
variability and other climatic changes—a role 
that is likely to become increasingly important. 
This includes providing supplementary 
irrigation even in the wet season in times of 
erratic rainfall, allowing farmers to complete the 
cultivation of two rice crops in the same season 
(de Silva and Senaratna-Sellamuttu 2012). 
However, UNDP and Ministry of Environment 
(2011) note that, while climate change 
adaptation recommendations for the country 
refer to the need for irrigation expansion, 
the case for irrigation is not clear-cut. The 
reasons are many, although one of the most 
fundamental appears to be the basic question 
discussion
of how much water is actually available or can 
be made available affordably, to underwrite 
future investments in irrigation. This applies not 
only to areas currently without irrigation, but to 
many existing schemes which exist in spite of 
poor water availability in a physical sense or due 
to uneconomical access. This has led CEDAC 
(2010) to conclude that most irrigation schemes 
have been found to be economically unviable. 
It has been further shown that this is not only 
due to water scarcity or other geographical 
factors, but because of poor scheme design 
and/or management (incomplete and/or poorly 
maintained infrastructure).
What should be the realistic role of 
irrigated agriculture in Cambodia? 
The discussion of both current policy narratives 
on agriculture and irrigation, and field-based 
findings in the literature, suggest a significant 
divergence between what the policies envisage 
as being possible and the messages from the 
field. Although agriculture is certainly a key 
component of poverty reduction and export 
revenue earnings, there are multiple conditions 
necessary for irrigated agriculture (especially 
rice) to be viable, both economically and in 
terms of efficient resource allocation. This 
suggests a need to re-evaluate current policy 
within the contexts at play at smaller spatial 
scales (such as river basins/sub-basins) to 
ensure that future investments in irrigation are 
suited to contexts that make it physically and 
economically viable. For example, according 
to Yu and Fan (2009), improved access to roads 
can increase the output of wet-season paddy in 
the Tonle Sap, but has little impact on farmers in 
the Plateau/Mountain zone. However, in regions 
with high potential and reliable market access, 
policies promoting high-value crops could also 
substantially increase farmers’ incomes and 
help lift them out of poverty. Similarly, a social 
assessment of selected irrigation schemes in six 
provinces around the Tonle Sap Lake found that 
farmers do not grow dry-season rice because 
of: insufficient water availability, location of 
irrigation schemes in lowland areas, the high 
cost of pumping water from the main canal 
to rice fields, poor water retention of sandy 
disCussion
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soils, and the greater likelihood of the harm 
posed by insects and/or free-roaming livestock 
to dry-season rice (CDRI 2010). Thus, what is 
being recommended is the allocation of the 
investment portfolios available under SAW and 
other policies through a bottom-up assessment 
of area-specific opportunities.
In terms of the availability of water resources, 
such a strategic planning process will encounter 
a range of contexts that fall between two 
extremes: severe physical scarcity and an 
abundance of surface water for irrigation. 
Areas that have adequate water resources 
may still present logistical (cost) issues with 
respect to the conveyance of water from 
source to field, depending on its topography. 
Supplying irrigation water in such contexts 
may prove to be economically prohibitive, even 
assuming perfect production and post-harvest 
conditions (quality and affordable inputs, sound 
management, good prices, stable markets, etc.). 
However, others may be potentially profitable, 
if government leadership can alleviate the 
existing conditions that prevent farmers from 
increasing production efficiency and realizing 
the real value of their produce. This would mean 
making production affordable and productive, 
while facilitating stable markets offering good 
prices. The following discussion attempts to 
provide some perspectives on options for 
different scenarios.
Areas encountering physical water scarcity 
or prohibitive economic scarcity
The options are less clear in regions where 
irrigation is simply not possible, due to physical 
water scarcity or where providing irrigation 
from surface water sources is economically 
prohibitive, especially for rice production. 
As Perera (2006) points out, and is discussed 
elsewhere in this report, institution (i.e. FWUCs) 
building in irrigation schemes is not an easy 
task unless farmers believe that there will be 
definite improvements in irrigation services. 
Given the seemingly high percentage of 
schemes with fundamental design flaws, it is 
difficult to see how this is possible through the 
provision of more or better timed irrigation 
water, without leading to major infrastructure 
changes. Even such changes may not help 
schemes that are affected by physical water 
scarcity. 
The efficiency-oriented response would be to 
promote less water-intensive crop options or 
even move completely out of agriculture. ADB 
(2011b) notes that activities such as vegetable 
and mushroom growing, pig fattening, chicken 
raising and fish farming are more profitable 
than traditional paddy production and have 
had high adoption rates. However, it also 
acknowledges that for most farmer households, 
these activities will be supplementary to 
paddy cultivation rather than substitutes for 
it. This is ascribed to household food security 
considerations and perceived risks associated 
with non-traditional agricultural activities 
(see also Tong et al. 2011). The challenge of 
displacing rice with more water-efficient 
alternatives, or displacing agriculture itself 
as the primary livelihood activity, is likely to 
be even more complex, given that paddy 
cultivation is deeply, historically, and culturally 
entrenched in Cambodia (as with most Asian 
people) not just as a staple food, but as an 
activity around which much of daily life and 
even value systems and beliefs are organized. 
Even if historical and cultural attachments 
were overcome, there would still need to be an 
effective national system of food distribution in 
place (if food production is to be concentrated 
where it is most economical) at prices lower 
than the costs of local production, to avoid food 
scarcity and/or malnutrition. The availability 
of alternate livelihood options will also have 
a significant bearing, irrespective of whether 
food security can be assured, given the diverse 
role of income in people’s well-being. Migration 
may also become a coping strategy, but only for 
those able to provide labor elsewhere. 
Another option that does not appear to 
have been considered in Cambodia so far is 
groundwater irrigation. Groundwater is widely 
used for domestic water supply in Cambodia, 
and is being increasingly used for small-scale 
irrigation. Small-scale pump irrigation from 
groundwater can avoid the need for the large 
investments in storage and transmission 
infrastructure required for surface water 
irrigation, while providing farmers with water in 
a timely and reliable manner. 
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Groundwater may present an opportunity for 
Cambodia to broaden its irrigation options by 
developing an efficient model of small-scale 
irrigation, instead of—or in conjunction with—
formal surface-water irrigation that brings with 
it expensive infrastructure and problems of 
operation and maintenance. Or is it inherently 
unsustainable and suitable only for limited 
applications? The dearth of water resource 
data, especially with respect to groundwater, 
makes this an open question that needs further 
investigation (see Johnston 2013). 
Areas which are potentially viable
The economic viability of providing irrigation 
water is influenced by the interplay between 
the costs of water supply, efficient production 
management and the opportunities for farmers 
to realize the full value of their crops. In many 
of the irrigation schemes cited as examples 
in this paper, a common issue was farmers’ 
inability to optimize productivity due to poor 
input access and quality issues, and equally a 
lack of opportunities to get good prices for their 
produce, along with other issues surrounding 
storage and market uncertainty. In such 
schemes, considering the very low productivity 
returns of additional water use reported by 
CDRI (Wokker et al. 2011), it is argued that 
allocating more resources for addressing non-
water constraints may offer more significant 
productivity and income gains compared to 
further investments in the irrigation schemes.
From the input side, some studies (Yu and Fan 
2009; Sothath and Sophal 2010) suggest that the 
current scenario of underapplication and poor 
quality of fertilizer accounts for as much as a 30% 
loss in production, and when that is combined 
with irrigation, the gains can reach 40% (Sothath 
and Sophal 2010). However, the externalities 
associated with intensive fertilizer use can give 
rise to difficult trade-offs in terms of their impact 
on overall human well-being, and a resulting 
loss of ecosystem services such as fisheries. 
While specific estimates of value gains are not 
given, the discussion on post-harvest constraints 
illustrates the market-related factors that not only 
undermine farmers’ income, but also appear to 
discourage them from maximizing production. 
This takes the form of choosing not to cultivate 
on all of the available land and refraining from 
investing in new hard and soft technologies (even 
when funds are available) where uncertainty is 
perceived in the market (e.g. low price, inability to 
absorb supply). These constraints are shaped by 
other weaknesses in the sector, such as the virtual 
absence of a post-harvest industry for value 
addition, causing surplus produce to be sold 
immediately upon harvesting—mainly through 
informal cross-border arrangements with Thai 
and Vietnamese traders and at lower than market 
prices. Investments in developing such capacities 
appear to hold significant value, assuming 
that Cambodia can become a competitive rice 
exporter in the region (i.e. Southeast Asia). 
Although recent studies suggest an expansion 
of formal credit services in the agriculture sector, 
there appears to be a considerable need for 
much larger flows of funding to underwrite the 
hardware investments needed for establishing 
storage and milling services. The mix of issues 
will vary in different regions and schemes, and 
the challenge for the government and donors is 
to ensure that their money is targeted at the best 
opportunities in each context. 
Such a view appears to correlate with 
conclusions made by Sothath and Sophal 
(2010), who examined the allocation of 
ASSDP and SAW budgets across subsectors. 
Although they acknowledge that the policies 
target smallholder farmers by allocating 
larger proportions of their proposed budgets 
to areas such as: food security, productivity, 
diversification, research and extension, water 
resources, irrigation and land management, 
they found that significant resources have 
been diverted away from subsectors meant 
to benefit smallholder farmers in relation to 
the ASSDP costing. For instance, the share 
of disbursements to agricultural research 
and extension has not even been half of its 
costing. Under SAW, food security, agricultural 
and agribusiness support, and agriculture 
and water research, education and extension 
are underfunded, with a large share of 
resources being channelled to finance capital 
expenditure in water resources and irrigation. 
Similarly, during the period 2007–2009, aid 
disbursements to food security, productivity 
and diversification represented about 55% of 
total aid disbursed to agriculture, which is still 
below the costing level. The question is not 
whether irrigation schemes are necessary, but 
whether they are operational and effective 
(Sothath and Sophal 2010).
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Interestingly, the same authors conclude that 
the policy formulation process does not seem 
to have been evidence-based, as there has 
been no comprehensive assessment of farmers’ 
challenges and needs. This analysis argues 
that such attention to farmers’ challenges 
needs to happen at subnational scales, and 
must seek to understand the variation in the 
combination of issues from one area to another. 
Diepart (2010) concludes that recent rural 
development policies offer a poor synthesis of 
peasant rationalities and only poorly capture 
the real dynamism of peasant communities. 
The peasant contribution to the development 
of the rural landscape has been largely 
underestimated. A market-based approach has 
been preferred, leaving these communities to 
bear the costs of transition to markets. 
Two concerns about current policy and practice 
emerge. The first issue is the lack of depth 
in the problem analysis informing existing 
policies, which appear to prescribe blanket 
remedies across the country, which may lead 
to an inefficient allocation of funds in the form 
of inappropriately targeted interventions. 
This in turn poses questions about the policy-
development process, particularly with respect 
to the extent of stakeholder consultations—the 
breadth of stakeholders and the geographical 
scales involved. The second issue concerns the 
allocation of resources, given the apparent 
deviation from stated budgetary divisions. 
Both of these issues are central to agricultural 
performance from a macro perspective, in 
terms of whom the proposed interventions 
will benefit, and who will bear the brunt of the 
resulting externalities.
the governance problem
Underpinning the discussions on improving 
the production process is the perennial issue of 
poor system maintenance and management. 
While exceptions exist, the majority of studies 
of FWUC performance suggest that the PIMD 
approach via FWUCs has been unable to 
generate the income necessary for maintaining 
existing and often incomplete infrastructure, or 
to provide the leadership in water governance 
to make irrigation efficient and equitable. These 
concerns, which result from problems with ISF 
collection, are closely associated with broader 
issues of FWUC operations and capabilities, 
and inherited fundamental design limitations. 
The relationships between FWUCs, MoWRAM 
and the PDoWRAMs, have not supplied the 
technical backstopping necessary to support 
an experiment in participatory resource 
management in an extremely challenging 
context. Relationships with other key local 
players, such as commune councils, have added 
further layers of complexity that simultaneously 
seem to erode (overlapping functions) and 
support (merger of memberships) FWUC 
authority. Water governance manifests 
differently in various schemes, which further 
emphasizes the error in deriving policy on a 
generalized view of context (Chea et al. 2011). 
Cambodia’s irrigation governance institutions 
are very recent and unstable, and the country 
has a long history of political disruption and 
internal migration which has prevented a 
synergy of its physical and socio-cultural 
topographies from developing. The success of 
the development philosophy of decentralization 
and deconcentration, and enhanced local 
participation in the rural Cambodian context, 
is inhibited by the historical experiences of the 
people and embedded cultural norms (Chea 
et al. 2011). These two problems have led 
to the manifestation of idealized theoretical 
governance policies at the policy level, whereby 
FWUCs have, to a large extent, become 
inefficient and dependent extensions of the 
line ministries, instead of independent and 
sustainable local governance bodies. 
The current one-size-fits-all approach of FWUCs 
creates a fundamental constraint to irrigation 
water management and to agricultural 
production overall. The logical question is 
where and in which circumstances does 
the FWUC model work, and whether these 
conditions suggest opportunities for improving 
FWUCs elsewhere, or whether they are so 
context-specific that they hold little relevance 
in other settings. Where the latter is the case, 
other models will need to be found. In fact, the 
need for a divergence of institutional models 
may be driven by the need for more flexible 
approaches to irrigation, especially where the 
reservoir and canal systems are inherently 
inefficient and unsustainable. Any shift to 
other irrigation mechanisms (e.g. groundwater, 
surface water pumping, and conjunctive use of 
groundwater and surface water), would require 
local institutions that reflect different irrigation 
water management challenges.
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The challenges of institutions also applies to 
the broader task of enhancing the overall value 
offered to farmers by agriculture, in light of the 
many production and post-harvest constraints 
detailed above. What is not clear is whether 
the investments in technological and technical 
capacity, and linkages required between 
various actors, can be generated through a 
single formal institutional arrangement, or 
through a combination of formal and less 
formal ones. However, several to address these 
problems are already in place.
Agricultural cooperatives 
An alternative institutional mechanism currently 
gaining traction with both the government and 
donors is the agricultural cooperative (AC),14 
as a mechanism for empowering integrated 
self-development in the agriculture sector 
(de Silva and Senaratna-Sellamuttu 2012). 
Acknowledging that FWUCs are not empowered 
or able to influence a wide enough spectrum 
of production and post-harvest factors (e.g. 
access to inputs, post-harvest value addition), 
ACs appear to be a direct response by the 
government to these weaknesses. IWMI (de Silva 
and Senaratna-Sellamuttu 2012) notes several 
structural features that seek an institution with 
a greater ability to exercise control over factors 
of production and influence post-harvest 
processes towards better prices through value 
addition. For instance, the distribution of 60% 
of annual profits amongst AC members, based 
on shares held, provides an annual return on 
investment and could, at least in theory, provide 
the incentive for collective action that FWUCs 
appear unable to generate. 
The cooperative model in theory appears 
to represent a more integrated approach to 
sector development, whereby existing isolated 
initiatives, such as savings groups and seed banks 
that often function only if external funds are 
available, can be brought into the cooperative 
and linked to other components of production. It 
is envisaged that this will also spark new ventures 
in seed production, drying and storage, and other 
business activities linked to the agriculture sector, 
making farmers less dependent on external 
actors. Examples are also appearing on the 
ground of attempts to realize this potential. For 
instance, according to Heifer Cambodia (2012), 
the Agricultural Cooperative of Ponleur Strey is 
helping start-up businesses in Dak So Sor Village, 
Battambang Province. The group plans to run 
businesses selling animal feed, fertilizer and 
horticulture equipment, as well as a rice bank for 
people in the community, and hopes to use its 
existing accumulated savings fund worth more 
than KHR 7 million (or US$ 1,750). 
Another major advantage of ACs appears to 
be the economies of scale available through 
collective action, in terms of sourcing inputs 
at cheaper prices through bulk orders directly 
from manufacturers and negotiating market 
prices for produce on behalf of its members. 
In theory, at least, the logic and organizational 
structure of ACs is appealing in its potential 
to overcome some of the key weaknesses of 
farmer-based organizations. This belief seems 
to be reflected in the increasing number 
of cooperatives throughout the country, 
with an estimated 288 in various stages of 
registration and operation, and more being 
formed. Moreover, a number of donors are now 
promoting and supporting the formation of 
agricultural cooperatives and, consequently, 
they are now a reality to contend with. The 
potential for generating bottom-up sector 
development appears to make this an 
interesting experiment, but is an area which 
needs a detailed in-context study before the 
mistake of FWUC mass replication is repeated.
While FWUCs are the responsibility of 
MoWRAM and the PDoWRAMs, primary 
responsibility for agricultural cooperatives lies 
with the Department of Agricultural Extension 
(DAE) of MAFF, which includes an Office of 
Farmers’ Organizations. The functions of this 
office include developing and maintaining 
government legislation for the formulation 
and registration of agricultural cooperatives 
in Cambodia; promoting and facilitating the 
formulation of agricultural cooperatives based 
on local needs and potential, by providing 
appropriate training and technical support to 
provincial and district extension staff in the 
relevant laws, regulations and administrative 
procedures; disseminating rules on ACs to 
farmers, NGOs, international organizations 
and potential donors; providing training 
courses to leaders and members of agricultural 
cooperatives; and conducting external audits 
to help ACs in financial management and 
bookkeeping (ICA ROAP 2007). These functions 
are carried out through the Provincial Office 
of Agriculture Extension (POAE) under the 
Provincial Department of Agriculture (PDA).
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Private sector models for delivering 
agriculture services 
A number of small-scale private enterprises 
provide a range of services for agriculture 
and other rural development needs. These 
enterprises and their customers have invested 
in a rapidly expanding market for water and 
other services, using a variety of financing 
arrangements with little external assistance 
from the public sector. They can leverage funds, 
offer good quality products and services, and 
maintain accountability for any issues that 
arise. This has led to high customer satisfaction 
and increasing sustainability (WSP 2004). The 
Farm Business Advisors (FBAs) created by iDE 
is an example of this. iDE trains independent 
private microentrepreneurs who provide high-
quality agricultural products, technical advice 
and market information to smallholder farmers. 
FBAs travel within a six- to ten-village circuit 
helping farmers to improve, intensify or expand 
market-oriented agricultural production in 
Prey Veng, Svay Rieng, Siem Reap, Banteay 
Meanchey and Oddar Meanchey provinces, and 
plan to commence services in Kampot, Takeo 
and Kandal in 2013. FBAs analyze individual 
farm enterprises and match any constraints or 
missed opportunities they identify with the 
products and services in their ‘toolkit’, which 
includes irrigation equipment, good quality 
seeds, fertilizer, pest control, plastic mulch, 
plastic fencing and trellising (iDE 2009). FBAs 
sell products and services at a profit—often 
on credit with payment due at harvest—and 
provide technical advice as an embedded 
service. On average, each FBA serves about 90 
clients and earns gross profits averaging US$ 
53 per month, with highest earnings of US$ 
105 (iDE 2010). Farmer clients are estimated to 
earn an additional net income averaging US$ 
110 per year after receiving FBA support for one 
year, with strong evidence that female farmers 
have been able to access and benefit from the 
products and information provided by FBAs 
(iDE 2010). It is also claimed that FBA services 
have been reaching low-income households: 
based on standard government poverty 
classifications, 52% of FBA clients are either 
‘poor’ or ‘very poor’ (iDE 2010).
The Cambodia Agricultural Value Chain 
Program (CAVAC) is a program which aims to 
increase farmer incomes in rice-based farming 
systems by accelerating growth in the value of 
agricultural production, through the linking of 
suppliers to farmers and farmers to consumers 
in Kampot, Takeo and Kampong Thom 
provinces. This approach tackles the following 
issue: rural areas are distant and disconnected, 
populations are spread out, infrastructure is 
poor, resources and information are scarce, 
particularly for poor farmers, both farmers and 
service providers struggle to reach each other, 
and transaction costs are high and efficiency 
is low. CAVAC identifies innovations that can 
overcome these inefficiencies, enabling farmers 
and public and private ‘support providers’ to 
access, communicate and engage with one 
another in new ways. These include: low-cost 
irrigation schemes managed locally, supporting 
progressive farmers to serve as change agents 
in their villages, encouraging input suppliers 
to use their retail networks to provide advice 
to farmers, as well as providing appropriate 
fertilizer and pesticides, and building networks 
between model farmers, government agencies 
and the private sector (Hitchins et al. 2012). The 
power to stimulate local entrepreneurship and 
the resulting creativity in resolving challenges 
demonstrated by these examples reveals the 
significant potential offered by small-scale 
private sector service delivery models in 
overcoming a range of current constraints. They 
suggest a need to recognize the comparative 
advantages and limitations of what public 
institutions and private market systems can 
deliver, so that the best of both sets of actors 
can be used in a more coordinated manner 
in delivering the services needed, especially 
by smallholder farmers. In view of the thin 
spread of PDoWRAM and PDA capacities, one 
option would be to use private actors to deliver 
information and hard and soft technologies 
to the end-users, while the state (at national, 
provincial and district levels) facilitates and 
regulates (e.g. setting and ing quality standards 
for seeds and other inputs) the generation/
access of information, knowledge and 
technologies. The impact such a network of 
service providers could have on the viability of 
FWUCs is unclear, although CAVAC is currently 
experimenting with such linkages (Phallika, 
personal communication).15
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Agriculture for poverty reduction or 
agriculture for export? An emerging 
policy dilemma?
A government is required to address 
developmental challenges at different scales. 
In Cambodia’s case, the government has set 
out to concurrently address rural poverty 
and increase government foreign exchange 
revenue through increased rice production 
and export. Poverty reduction is both noble 
and necessary, while expanding government 
revenue sources can be diverted to other forms 
of public expenditure with social benefits. 
The problem arises in attempting to achieve 
these objectives through agriculture, and rice 
production, as each objective requires the 
promotion of different and mutually exclusive 
production models. In the case of poverty 
reduction, the approach must respect the 
reality of many distributed small landholdings, 
which in many cases, represent one amongst 
a suite of livelihood activities that collectively 
form household livelihood systems. On the 
other hand, maximizing rice (and other crop) 
production for export calls for intensification 
in search of the economies of scale that will 
generate efficiency and the desired surpluses, 
once domestic demand is satisfied. Not only 
will this concentrate agricultural land in few 
hands, but these hands are unlikely to belong 
to smallholders who, as has been amply 
demonstrated, do not have the financial and 
associated capital necessary for this scale of 
production. This is then the policy dilemma 
inherent in current policies such as SAW. 
The Policy Document on Promotion of Paddy 
Production and Export of Milled Rice (RGC 2004) 
operates against the interests of smallholders, 
by focusing on production volumes and 
efficiencies in production, at the expense of 
smallholder farmers, many of whom are unable 
to contribute to this objective. 
While it is clear that the opening of export 
markets and investments in milling and 
other value-adding capacities will benefit 
smallholders, the issue is fundamentally 
driven by the implications for landownership 
in a national context, where access to land 
remains the primary productive asset for a 
majority of Cambodians. Intensification that 
involves larger production units can involve 
several other land-use trade-offs detrimental 
to smallholder households, which are linked 
to their multi-resource dependant livelihood 
strategies. The importance of this multi-activity 
livelihood strategy becomes apparent given 
that, according to the World Food Programme 
website,16 in a bad year only the better-off 
farmers can sell some rice, while the middle 
and poor households consume all their harvest 
and store the rest for seed. Even within large 
rice-producing provinces, 30% of communes 
face chronic food shortages, and an estimated 
one in five rural inhabitants is unable to secure 
enough food to meet the nutritional norm of 
2,100 calories per day and, as a consequence, 
malnutrition is widespread. While agriculture is 
the mainstay of these livelihood systems, it is by 
no means adequate to meet a household’s food 
and nutritional requirements, and does not 
provide the opportunity to earn an income. In 
such cases, other livelihood activities, including 
access to other land uses and ecosystem 
services, may be more relevant.
Loosing fish to grow rice
As noted by MRC (2008), the significance of 
rice-field fisheries for Cambodia’s population 
lies not only in their yield and contribution 
to nutrition, but in the dispersal of benefits 
through the population, particularly to the rural 
poor—many of whom are landless and have 
limited opportunities for employment. The 
traditional farming system uses comparatively 
low inputs of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, 
and involves prolonged inundation of fields. 
This allows a diverse native aquatic fauna to 
persist, which forms the basis of an important 
fishery. Nguyen-Khoa et al. (2005) warn that 
a reduction in rice field water storage with 
irrigation, increased use of agrochemicals 
and barriers to fish migration created by 
irrigation infrastructure could threaten fisheries 
production. They point out that agricultural 
productivity gains from such practices would 
need to offset the concomitant loss of fisheries, 
in order to be beneficial in aggregate terms. 
Based on surveys in 2004, MRC (2008) states 
that these losses (in monetary terms) come 
close to matching the then value of agriculture, 
where smallholder farmers earned about US$ 
150/ha, on average, as a gross income from 
wet-season rain-fed rice farming, while the 
fishery was worth about US$ 102/ha as a gross 
value. According to Thuon et al. (2007), if wild 
capture fisheries are affected by agricultural 
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intensification, attempts to compensate 
by developing aquaculture face not only 
impediments related to landholding size and 
location as discussed below, but may tend to 
shift the workload onto women and children. 
A weakness in the common-property nature of 
the rice field fishery, however, is that since each 
farmer cannot control access to this resource 
(landholdings are generally small, often 
fragmented, and distant from their owners’ 
houses), none would have a direct incentive 
to conserve the fishery or to invest in simple 
measures such as trap ponds that would greatly 
increase fish production and capture efficiency 
(MRC 2008). Nevertheless, the rice-field fishery 
is accessed by most rural people during some 
part of the year.
A counter-argument to the loss of rice-field 
fisheries is that the creation of reservoirs 
provides an alternate fishery. IWMI’s focus 
group discussions with fisheries committee 
members from the Kamping Pouy and Boeng 
Sne irrigation schemes (de Silva and Senaratna-
Sellamuttu 2012), indicate that the reservoir 
fisheries in both schemes have declined 
significantly due to resource governance 
challenges, resulting from a relatively large 
area that poses rule ement challenges and the 
task of coordinating management amongst 
several fisheries committees spread across 
multiple communes. MRC (2008) recognizes 
that the value of pest control for indigenous 
carnivorous air-breathing blackfish and 
naturally occurring predators, such as frogs and 
toads, has never been scientifically evaluated. 
Unlike the introduced species (e.g. common 
carp, Nile tilapia and silver barb), which are 
commonly used in rice-fish culture, native 
species can move freely through rice fields, as 
they are essentially amphibious and do not 
require oxygenated water to survive. These 
indigenous fish do not require the same level of 
management as introduced fish, which cannot 
tolerate deoxygenation and usually require 
that some rice-growing area is sacrificed to 
make refuges for them. Furthermore, when 
rice plants are actively growing, shading 
virtually eliminates other saprophytes and 
plankton, forcing the introduced fish to feed 
on poor-quality detritus. This does not apply 
to indigenous fish that have coevolved in 
traditionally managed rice fields. Carnivorous 
fish are generally better food fish, preferred 
by villagers, and they fetch a higher price 
than omnivorous or herbivorous fish. Another 
important consideration is that fish from rice 
fields may well constitute a household’s primary 
and most affordable source of animal protein, 
and definitely represent far greater nutritional 
values than rice. The trade-off in nutritional 
terms is likely to be significantly detrimental. 
Thus, considering these factors integrating the 
rice-field fishery with agricultural development 
should be carefully considered, since further 
intensification to a double-cropping rice system 
can be expected to create conditions that are 
less favorable for many aquatic organisms  
(MRC 2008). In the Stung Chinit irrigation 
scheme, for instance, even though a fishery 
survey in 2003–2004 identified 79 species, only 
53 species were found after the construction of 
the scheme and despite the operation of a fish 
ladder (Thuon n.d.). Moreover, most of the fish 
that migrate through the fish ladder are small 
and can only be used to make fish sauce, food 
for pigs, or used as fertilizer with low economic 
value. Also, dry-season water levels did not 
permit fish to migrate through the fish pass. 
Agrochemical intensification and impacts of 
freshwater production systems
While the impacts of intensification of fertilizer 
and other agrochemical use on groundwater 
is not well understood, greater certainty may 
be ascribed to its impacts on surface water 
ecosystems, including fisheries and rice-fish 
systems, both of which lie well within rural 
smallholder livelihood systems. The return of 
water used for irrigation to its source means 
that the impacts of chemical use will not 
be restricted to the people who use it, or to 
localized ecosystems. Thus, the potential for 
damaging key natural resources that underpin 
a range of rural livelihoods across a large 
population is high.  
Impediments to livestock
According to Thuon et al. (2007), the 
construction of irrigation infrastructure can 
create more problems for rural livelihoods 
than before and illustrates this through the 
impacts of cattle rearing, which is one of the 
major income generation activities, apart from 
paddy cultivation. Farmers who live within 
irrigated areas have been forced to sell some of 
their livestock due to the many rules related to 
disCussion
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unlined canal maintenance, and the reduction 
of grazing land within the scheme. This is 
because, prior to existence of the scheme, 
livestock were allowed to freely roam in the 
fields after the rice harvest. The propensity 
for conflict between these two land uses is 
illustrated by the fact that CDRI (2010) presents 
the issue from the opposite perspective, 
noting that in several schemes, animal raising 
and grazing practices make it very difficult for 
farmers to move into dry-season farming, as it is 
customary for households that own livestock to 
herd them in open paddy areas during the dry 
season.  
Loss of forests
There is no question that intensification and 
expansion of agriculture for export will require 
the conversion of more forestland, to make way 
for large agriculture operations or to provide 
land for smallholders displaced from irrigation 
schemes and other cultivation areas. Loss of 
forests means loss of a diverse range of free 
resources for the poor. In addition to loss of 
forests due to ELCs is its illegal conversion, 
often by outsiders, to grow cash crops such as 
cassava, soybeans and maize. CDRI (2012) note 
the prevalence of such conversions prior to 
elections, and cite the massive legal and illegal 
conversion of forestland and flooded forests 
for cultivation during the run-up to the 2008 
elections.
The range of trade-offs between agriculture 
and other forms of productive land uses, as 
described in the preceding paragraphs, and 
which are likely to be borne by smallholder 
farmers, demonstrates the need for a holistic 
evaluation of the merits of changes to farming 
systems based on assessments of their overall 
socioeconomic effects, particularly on the more 
vulnerable segments of the population (Thuon 
et al. 2007). The same authors further suggest 
that most proposals for large-scale irrigation 
schemes in Cambodia underestimate the 
impacts of such schemes on natural products, 
and overlook the livelihood and social activities 
that are dependent upon natural capital, such 
as wetland habitats, which are lost during the 
development of irrigation schemes. 
Sothath and Sophal (2010) demonstrate 
the discrepancy between policy statements 
prioritizing the role of smallholders in 
alleviating rural poverty and the allocation 
of state resources (MAFF and MoWRAM) and 
foreign aid flows away from smallholders. 
These authors and others have confirmed 
the continued issuance of economic land 
concessions, despite policy recognizing the 
need for their review. Such inconsistencies 
suggest an ascendancy of agricultural 
intensification which appears to be facilitated 
by what seems to be an increasing trend of 
smallholder exit from irrigation schemes, 
allowing for land concentration amongst a 
fewer larger landowners due to liberalization of 
the land market.
disCussion
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This review has attempted to use on-the-ground findings and the opinions of a diverse range of 
observers to critically assess the implications of agriculture and associated policy on the specific 
realities of smallholder farmers. In doing so, the analysis is biased towards the socioeconomic 
implications for a group of vulnerable people (poor smallholders farmers) who are of interest under 
the Millennium Development Goals.
The results of the analysis suggest a fundamental gulf between problem statements and 
prescriptions within the ASSDP and SAW, and the spatial variation in the mix of factors affecting 
agricultural production and the effectiveness of irrigation, as well as the ability of poor smallholder 
farmers to produce more food more affordably. With respect to the policy of PIMD, the conclusions 
of Perera (2006) continue to hold true today. Implementation of PIMD in Cambodia under 
existing unfavorable conditions, including high levels of poverty, low agricultural productivity 
and deteriorated irrigation systems with frequently poor design, is a difficult and challenging task 
(Perera 2006). In many irrigation schemes, the current PIMD does not encourage farmers to fully 
participate in paying irrigation service fees, O&M of the scheme or in water management, and 
this is unlikely to change, especially in schemes afflicted by physical (surface) water scarcity and/
or significant economic scarcity. In other areas, the identification of a wide range of structural 
constraints suggests scope for improving the efficiency and value of agriculture. Much of this 
potential lies in investments other than irrigation, although access to water, through surface 
irrigation or from groundwater, will remain a basic determinant of production. Different studies 
suggest different factors that promise high returns on investment. These include accessibility and 
intensification of better quality fertilizer and seeds, and promotion of small- and medium-scale 
industries to enable crop storage and value addition. In such cases, the performance of those 
schemes will probably improve, although it is unlikely to completely solve the ISF challenge, 
causing system performance to remain suboptimal. 
Addressing this will require the government to weigh the opportunity costs of further continuous 
and large investments in infrastructure rehabilitation, in light of the marginal returns on 
additional water in some schemes. Large irrigation projects have been less relevant, are likely to 
be considered less effective and efficient and are likely to be sustainable only if special inputs are 
provided (ADB 2010). The scope for identifying conventional large irrigation projects is limited 
in light of the low level of past successes and range of problems, and call for more innovative 
approaches such as smaller scale simple water resources management projects that are easier 
to implement under the evolving institutional capacity of the country. Such recommendations 
resonate with this review, which finds an insufficient level of subnational planning; the lack of 
coordination amongst irrigation schemes sharing the same water source; single-sector oriented 
and ad hoc planning; and the absence of hydrological data to provide a realistic planning context. 
Integration is required, where all CBNRM committees and state authorities in a catchment need 
to have a mechanism to work together and focus on horizontal accountability or coordination 
mechanisms (Chea 2010). 
These facts should then mitigate the urge on the part of the state to throw more money at a 
one-size-fits-all approach to irrigation, simply on the basis that the lack of a secure water supply 
restricts producers to a single, rain-fed rice crop per year, discouraging the diversification of 
local farming systems. Making such investments and then expecting the beneficiaries to realize 
returns is clearly contradictory in light of the diverse constraints highlighted in the literature. It is 
assumed that the motivation for the current emphasis on irrigation infrastructure is efficiency in 
resource allocation, and rehabilitation has not become an entrenched self-serving strategy for the 
bureaucracy.
ConClusions
ConClusions                                                                                  
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ConClusions
The findings on FWUCs suggest that more flexibility is necessary in envisaging local irrigation 
management institutions, especially if groundwater use for agriculture continues to grow. While 
the literature provides good analyses of why many FWUCs are struggling, there needs to be an 
examination of where they do work well and the potential for improving other FWUCs. Such 
improvements will be possible in limited contexts—we need to think  beyond the FWUC model 
for institutional options for irrigation management. This could involve nurturing of the various 
small-scale private sector initiatives that appear to deliver services more efficiently and effectively, 
especially to the smaller end-users. Supporting and using linkages amongst a growing number 
of non-state actors can be a win-win strategy for the government to better focus the scant and 
sectorally alienated resources at provincial and district levels.
This review also sheds light on the practical incompatibility of simultaneously pursuing agriculture-
driven rural poverty reduction, whilst also seeking to maximize agriculture exports, especially 
rice. This dichotomy lies in the need for opposing systems of production, which hold significantly 
different implications for the poor smallholder farmer. Adoption of a more spatially differentiated 
investment strategy, as already suggested, may offer opportunities for a compromise whereby 
a balance can be achieved between intensified large-scale production for export and targeted 
investments to alleviate at least some of the constraints that prevent the rural poor from moving 
out of poverty. 
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notes
notes                                                                                                
1 Launched in 2004, and updated in 2008 as Phase II.
2 A household can receive up to 5 ha of land, according to the Sub-decree on Social Land 
Concessions (Üllenberg, 2009).
3 After five years of occupation, the land recipient would then be eligible to apply for 
landownership title.
4 Smallholders in Cambodia have farms less than 3 ha in area. According to this definition,  
94.3 percent of farms in Cambodia are small and this is based on a survey carried out by  
Agri-Business Institute Cambodia (ABIC) in 2005 (Sothath and Sophal 2010).
5 No. 146 ANK/BK
6 Irrigation Development in Cambodia in 2011
 Source: http://trustbuilding.wordpress.com/2011/04/27/irrigation-development-in-cambodia-
in-2011/
7 The FWUCs were classified into three categories: those functioning well, defined as being active 
with O&M, regular meetings and irrigation service fee collection; those that could function 
where there was some activity in O&M; and those that did not function at all.
8 To be formally and legally recognized, each FWUC (along with its governing statutes) must be 
registered with the provincial or municipal directorate of MoWRAM.
9 Interestingly, Article 45 of the same law excludes forestry from the purview of commune 
councils.
10 From 9.532 million in 1990 to 14.138 million by 2010 (a rise of 67% over two dacades) according 
to the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United 
Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision: http://esa.un.org/unpd/
wpp/Excel-Data/population.htm
11 The Cambodian government provided subsidized fertilizer in the 1980s and 1990s until the 
private sector came into the fertilizer market in 1997, at which time the government stopped 
providing the subsidy.
12 Despite these findings, the authors conclude that the coverage of agricultural services for 
smallholder farmers is quite wide in the districts of Takeo and one district of Kandal, and that the 
percentage of villages with access to services in these districts ranges from 70 to 100 percent. 
This is a surprising conclusion in light of the significant paucity of human and other resources 
they document, although it can be seen to illustrate a variation between districts.
13 http://www.foodsecurityatlas.org/khm/country/access/livelihoods
14 Agricultural cooperatives are not new to Cambodia, with 390 multipurpose agricultural 
cooperatives existing in the 1950s and 1960s. However, under the regime of Democratic 
Kampuchea (1975–1979), all cooperatives were transformed into “Popular Communes” that 
operated on a collectivized basis to further the sociopolitical objectives of the government. 
After 1979, the collective cooperatives were again transformed into “Solidarity Groups” for 
collective production using the limited resources left after the Khmer Rouge regime, but these 
were mostly inactive. Government support for cooperatives reappeared in 2001, with the Royal 
Decree on Establishment and Functioning of Agricultural Cooperatives, and the “Proclamation 
on promulgating of the Royal Decree on establishment and functioning of agricultural 
cooperatives in Cambodia” (ICA ROAP 2007).
15 Directions for agricultural water management in Cambodia: a discussion 19–20 March 2013, 
Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
16 http://www.foodsecurityatlas.org/khm/country/access/livelihoods
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LAs local authorities
MAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
Mha million hectares
MLMUPC Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction
MoE Ministry of Environment
MoWRAM Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology
MRC Mekong River Commission
MRD Ministry of Rural Development
mt metric ton
NCDD National Committee for Sub-national Democratic Development
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NSDP National Strategic Development Plan
OAE Office of Agriculture Extension 
O&M operation and maintenance
PDA Provincial Department of Agriculture
PDAFF Provincial Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
PDoE Provincial Department of Environment
PDoWRAM Provincial Department of Water Resources and Meteorology
PDRD Provincial Department of Rural Development
PIMD Participatory Irrigation Management and Development
RGC Royal Government of Cambodia
RMA Rice Millers Association
RS Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency
SAW Strategy for Agriculture and Water
SFFSN Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition in Cambodia
SLCs social land concessions 
SME small and medium enterprises
TWGAW Technical Working Group on Agriculture and Water
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
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